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Criminal law aims to prohibit certain actions, and individual criminal liability 
allows for the evaluation of whether someone is guilty of a moral wrong. Given that 
a successful ban on autonomous weapon systems is unlikely (and possibly even 
detrimental), what is needed is a complementary legal regime that holds states 
accountable for the injurious wrongs that are the side effects of employing these 
uniquely effective but inherently unpredictable and dangerous weapons. Just as the 
Industrial Revolution fostered the development of modern tort law, autonomous 
weapon systems highlight the need for “war torts”: serious violations of international 
humanitarian law that give rise to state responsibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“There can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women.”1 
Imagine a marine autonomous weapon system, armed with torpedoes, 
designed to patrol within a preset region and attack anything it identifies as 
an enemy warship. Is anyone liable if it sinks a cruise ship, resulting in the 
deaths of all aboard? Or envision a mobile, land-based autonomous weapon 
system, meant to provide force protection, that enters a remote village and 
kills every man, woman, and child it encounters. Who is responsible for that 
massacre? On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over 
eastern Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of all 298 individuals on board.2 Many 
were quick to argue that this action should have spurred prosecution, either 
as a war crime under international law or as murder under domestic criminal 
laws.3 But if an autonomous weapon system had fired the missile that downed 
the plane, could anyone be held accountable? 
Autonomous weapon systems are fundamentally different from prior forms 
of weaponry: their capacity for self-determined action makes them uniquely 
effective and uniquely unpredictable. Unlike conventional weapons or remotely 
operated drones, an autonomous weapon system can select and engage targets 
without human direction or oversight.4 And unlike landmines, trip-wire 
sentry guns, or other automated weapon systems, autonomous weapon 
systems do not simply react to preset triggers. Instead, they gather 
information from their environment and make independent calculations as to 
 
1 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 288 (2d ed. 1992). 
2 MH17 Malaysia Plane Crash: What We Know, BBC (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/ news/
world-europe-28357880 [https://perma.cc/8SRB-U9KW]. 
3 See, e.g., Alexis Flynn, Will the MH17 Disaster Be Prosecuted as a War Crime?, WALL ST. J. (July 
22, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/07/22/will-the-mh17-disaster-be-prosecuted-as-
a-war-crime [https://perma.cc/B3BQ-DXTE]; Kevin Jon Heller, MH17 Should Be Framed as Murder, 
Not as a War Crime, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 11, 2014, 9:33 AM), http://opiniojuris. org/2014/08/11/mh-
17-framed-murder-war-crime [https://perma.cc/HFJ5-EXG7]. 
4 Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1837, 1842 (2015) [hereinafter Crootof, Killer Robots] (defining an “autonomous weapon system” 
as “a weapon system that, based on conclusions derived from gathered information and 
preprogrammed constraints, is capable of independently selecting and engaging targets”); see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13-14 (2012) 
(defining “autonomous weapon systems” as ones which, “once activated, can select and engage 
targets without further intervention by a human operator”). Most drones in operation today are 
merely semi-autonomous, insofar as they require a human operator both to select and engage targets. 
Crootof, Killer Robots, supra, at 1844 n.10. 
Contrary to the general consensus, autonomous weapon systems are not some possible futuristic 
weaponry; rather, they exist and have been integrated into states’ armed forces. Id. at 1840 (mentioning 
the examples of China, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States). 
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how to act.5 The sheer complexity of autonomous weapon systems’ methods 
for making these determinations may make it impossible for human beings 
to predict what the systems will do,6 especially to the extent they operate in 
complex environments and are subject to various types of malfunction and 
corruption. More advanced autonomous weapon systems might even “learn” 
from in-field experiences or make probabilistic calculations.7  
Given their destructive capacity and their inherent unpredictability, if 
autonomous weapon systems continue to be fielded, they will inevitably be 
involved in an accident with devastating and deadly consequences. Assuming 
that no one intended for the accident to occur or acted recklessly, it is unlikely 
that any person could be held individually liable under existing international 
criminal law. By definition, war crimes—serious violations of international 
humanitarian law that give rise to individual criminal liability8—must be 
committed by a person acting “willfully,” which is usually understood as 
acting intentionally or recklessly.9 By challenging the presumption that 
 
5 Any attempt to distinguish between automated and autonomous systems based on their level of 
complexity runs into a line-drawing problem. And yet, the fact that some systems and not others are 
capable of conducting in-field, program-based, independent analysis does seem to be a relevant distinction, 
insofar as their actions are not entirely predetermined or predictable. See id at 1855-56; see also PAUL 
SCHARRE, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND OPERATIONAL RISK 12 (2016) http://www.cnas.org/
sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc
/72G9-CYRB] (describing different categories of autonomy and distinguishing them from the complexity 
of the system, the level of human supervision, and the task the system is designed to perform). 
6 It is tempting to suggest that responsibility for a given action can subsequently be determined 
by “looking at the code”—but this underestimates the sheer complexity of modern systems. See, e.g., 
Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 272, 284 (2011) (“[P]rograms with millions of lines of code are written by teams of 
programmers, none of whom knows the entire program; hence, no individual can predict the effect 
of a given command with absolute certainty, since portions of large programs may interact in 
unexpected, untested ways.”). 
7 See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 538-45 (2015) (discussing 
robotic “emergence,” the ability of robotic systems to adapt to circumstances and “learn” from mistakes). 
8 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm [https://perma.cc/KT77-8AFL] (stating that a 
war crime requires a “serious” violation of international humanitarian law that entails “the individual 
criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule”); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 65-66 (3d ed. 2013) (same); see also Rule 156. Definition of War Crimes, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 [https://perma.cc/E3P3-9LHM] (last visited Apr. 15, 
2016) [hereinafter ICRC Rule 156] (“[State p]ractice in the form of legislation, military manuals and 
case-law shows that war crimes are violations committed either by members of the armed forces or 
by civilians . . . .”). 
9 See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 994 (Yves 
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
Military_Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XKM-QQYV] [hereinafter 
ICRC COMMENTARY]; see also Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber 
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serious violations of international humanitarian law will not occur absent 
willful human action, autonomous weapon systems threaten to destabilize 
nearly seventy years of efforts to establish international criminal law. 
Individual criminal liability for war crimes grew from a deep-seated desire 
to hold individuals accountable for atrocities and to discourage future 
occurrences.10 Criminal law is useful for creating and enforcing prohibitions, 
and it therefore provides an appropriate liability regime for genocide, slavery, 
massacres, systematic rape, and other such outrages. But while autonomous 
weapon systems are capable of committing serious violations of international 
humanitarian law with tragic consequences, they are too useful to be 
criminalized. Not only do they offer a seductive combination of distance, 
accuracy, and lethality, this uniquely effective weaponry may prove to be more 
“humane” than human beings on the battlefield. Given their inherent value 
and their attendant risk, what is needed is a legal regime that regulates, rather 
than prohibits, the use of autonomous weapon systems. Enter tort law. 
Oddly, there is no well-developed field of international tort law. Many 
domestic legal subjects have an international corollary: there is civil rights 
law and international human rights law, intellectual property law and 
international intellectual property law, contracts and bilateral trade treaties. 
But tort law—the legal regime governing those noncontractual civil wrongs 
for which an individual can seek redress—does not have an obvious 
international doppelgänger.11 Environmental lawyers have long been trying 
to create international tort liability for transnational environmental damage, 
but their efforts have borne little fruit.12 Article 75 of the Rome Statute of the 
 
Judgment, ¶¶ 437, 439 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5AX-3ZXB]. 
10 While many attribute this development to the Nuremberg trials, see, e.g., Edoardo Greppi, The 
Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531, 
536-37 (1999) (“It was only after the Second World War that a movement started up within the 
international community which clearly began to shape a deeper consciousness of the need to prosecute 
serious violations of the laws of war, with regard both to the traditional responsibility of States and to 
the personal responsibility of individuals.” (footnotes omitted)), individual criminal liability for 
violations of the law of war significantly predates Nuremberg, see infra subsection I.B.1. 
11 See, e.g., Declaration of Kenneth Howard Anderson Jr. at 46, In re “Agent Orange” Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (N. 04-400) (“Although international law in narrow 
circumstances does provide for individual criminal liability, it does not generally provide for civil 
liability—not even for individuals, let alone for corporations.”). States, however, may seek compensation 
from other states for cross-border harms under the law of state responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) 
(affirming “every State’s obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary 
to the rights of other States”); Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 370, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2(2) 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 148, U.N. Doc. A/56/10. 
12 See, e.g., Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in International 
Environmental Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 837, 837 (2008) (“Despite decades of effort, the international 
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International Criminal Court (ICC) provides that the “Court may make an 
order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations 
to, or in respect of, victims.”13 While this marks the first time in the history 
of international law that individual victims may seek remedies before an 
international tribunal,14 the ICC appears unwilling to endorse employing 
Article 75 to justify tort-like compensation.15 The U.S. Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) is unusual domestic legislation in that it recognizes and creates federal 
subject matter jurisdiction for the prosecution of individuals for international 
torts.16 Scholars have proposed augmenting the ATS to create enterprise or 
group liability for international torts,17 but the possibility of tort liability in 
international law (as opposed to U.S. jurisprudence) remains 
underexplored.18 
 
community has stumbled in attempts to craft tort remedies for victims of transboundary 
environmental damage. More than a dozen civil liability treaties have been negotiated that create 
causes of action and prescribe liability rules, but few have entered into force, and most remain 
unadopted orphans in international environmental law.”). 
13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 75(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
14 See David Donat-Cattin, Article 75: Reparations to Victims (noting that all prior regimes had 
obligated only states to make reparations towards individual victims), in COMMENTARY ON THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 965, 966 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). 
15 The Trial Chamber issued its first decision discussing reparations in 2012, which the Appeals 
Chamber amended in March 2015. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Establishing the 
Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5BL-G7Z6], aff ’d, Judgment on the appeals 
against Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations (Mar. 3, 
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1919024.pdf [https://perma.cc/65TK-7ZF6]. Each 
opinion provided only for collective remedies, suggesting that the ICC may be more interested in 
using reparations to promote reconciliation than to provide compensation. See LUKE MOFFETT, 
JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 158 (2014). 
16 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
However, the international torts for which plaintiffs may sue are limited, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Marchain, 
542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004), and the Supreme Court has recently held that this statute presumably does 
not confer jurisdiction over torts that occurred outside the United States unless the claims “touch and 
concern the territory of the United States” with “sufficient force,” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petrol., 
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Moreover, while the ATS provides federal subject 
matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs suing under the ATS still must independently satisfy personal jurisdiction 
requirements. See Daimler v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (dismissing suit under ATS for lack of 
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants). 
17 See, e.g., Nilay Vora, Federal Common Law and Alien Tort Statute Litigation: Why Federal Common 
Law Can (and Should) Provide Aiding and Abetting Liability, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 195 (2009). 
18 See, e.g., Robert Alford, Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law 
Violations, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 1, 2010, 9:25 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/ 01/apportioning-
responsibility-among-joint-tortfeasors-for-international-law-violations [https://perma .cc/P9JK-
ZEXH] (discussing the lack of scholarship on the nexus between international law and domestic torts). 
Maya Steinitz, however, has recently undertaken the challenge of arguing for the creation of a 
permanent International Court of Civil Justice. See Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of 
Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014) (previewing a forthcoming book of the same title). 
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While the reasons for the dearth of scholarship on international tort 
liability are unclear, two facts are apparent. As evidenced by the varied and 
extensive ATS litigation in the United States, there is a strong desire to hold 
entities accountable for actions that fall short of incurring criminal liability. 
And yet, given the relatively undeveloped nature of the legal structures, states 
apparently have little interest in creating effective international tort liability 
regimes. Considering the lack of international tort law, it is not surprising 
that no one has yet evaluated whether it might be useful in addressing the 
autonomous weapon systems accountability gap.19 
However, this accountability gap is precisely the kind of problem tort law 
is designed to solve.20 Pressures similar to those that fostered the 
transformation of domestic tort law over a hundred years ago—the need to 
create a liability regime for the “stranger cases” resulting from the Industrial 
Revolution’s significant, unintended, machine-caused injuries—are at play 
again, now in the international sphere.21 As opposed to criminal law, which 
focuses on absolute prohibitions, tort law offers a means of regulating valuable 
but inherently dangerous activities and compensating injurious wrongs.  
As is often the case with new technology, autonomous weapon systems 
expose a gap in the existing legal order. They highlight that, while there is an 
established (if not necessarily practically effective) means of holding 
individuals accountable for war crimes, the institutional processes of holding 
states accountable for their “war torts” are relatively undeveloped. For a 
variety of reasons, autonomous weapon systems provide an ideal test case for 
the creation of a new liability regime for war torts; if such a regime proves to 
be a useful counterpart to international criminal law, states might consider 
the benefits of further expanding war torts liability.22 
 
19 To the extent those writing on autonomous weapon systems ever discuss tort law, they focus 
on practical obstacles to enforcement under domestic (usually American) tort law. See generally 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., MIND THE 
GAP: THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER ROBOTS 26-36 (2015), https://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/arms0415_ForUpload_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ8R-V7FG] [hereinafter 
MIND THE GAP]; Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal “Singularity”?, 2013 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 45. 
20 Cf. Madeline Elish & Tim Hwang, Praise the Machine! Punish the Human! The Contradictory 
History of Accountability in Automated Aviation (Data & Soc’y Research Inst., Working Paper No. 1, 
2015), http://www.datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Elish-Hwang_Accountability AutomatedAviation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/987C-TPSQ] (discussing how accidents caused by highly automated technologies 
were integrated relatively seamlessly into existing product liability and tort law regimes). 
21 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300 (2d ed. 1985); 
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 16 (1980). 
22 Michael Reisman proposed a general obligation for states to compensate for unintended 
injuries to civilians nearly twenty years ago, regardless of whether or not there was a violation of the 
law of war. See W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 381, 397 (1997); see also 
Yael Ronen, Avoid or Compensate? Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflicted During Armed 
Conflict, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 181 (2009) (arguing that states should be held strictly liable 
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Part I reviews the rise of individual criminal responsibility and discusses 
how it has largely obscured the role of the law of state responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Part II describes how, 
because of their propensity for unpredictable action, autonomous weapon 
systems undermine a foundational principle of international criminal law: 
that serious violations of international humanitarian law will not occur 
without an individual acting intentionally or recklessly. Part III proposes that 
how “war torts”—serious violations of international humanitarian law that 
give rise to state responsibility—are necessary to balance and complement 
“war crimes” and considers how autonomous weapon systems may provide an 
ideal test case for a war torts liability regime. 
I. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN ARMED CONFLICT 
A “war crime” is commonly understood as any serious violation of 
international humanitarian law, in either an international or non-
international armed conflict.23 This definition encompasses violations of jus 
ad bellum rules,24 such as the initiation of an aggressive war; violations of 
customary jus in bello rules,25 which might include intentionally targeting 
civilians or using weapons indiscriminately; or violations of specific treaty 
obligations or prohibitions, like mistreating prisoners of war or using 
chemical weapons.26 
The legal perpetrators and legal victims of the earliest “war crimes” were 
states, not individuals.27 While there are some notable exceptions—the 1305 
English trial of Scottish hero Sir William Wallace (of Braveheart fame) for waging 
indiscriminate war and the 1474 Austrian trial of Peter von Hagenbach for 
 
for injuries incurred by civilians in armed conflict). Autonomous weapon systems may create the 
opportunity and incentive for states to put this idea into practice. See infra Section III.B. 
23 ICRC Rule 156, supra note 8 (defining “war crimes” as “[g]rave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions”); Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b) & (c) (defining war crimes as “[o]ther 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict,” and “[o]ther 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international 
character”). The International Committee of the Red Cross observes that violations of the law of 
war tend to be considered serious, and therefore war crimes, “if they endanger protected persons or 
objects or if they breach important values.” See ICRC Rule 156, supra note 8 (providing examples). 
24 Jus ad bellum is the law governing the commencement of hostilities. 
25 Jus in bello is the law governing the conduct of hostilities. 
26 War crimes often coexist with crimes against humanity, which tend to be widespread or 
systematic practices that target civilian populations and might include massacres, human 
experimentation, or slavery. Cf. Greppi, supra note 10, at 549 (“If war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are now two autonomous, self-sustained categories, it cannot be denied that they are often 
closely linked in modern conflicts, especially in connection with crimes against the civilian 
population.”). Crimes against the peace, in contrast, tend to be associated with instigating wars of 
aggression in contravention of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art 2, ¶4; see also id. arts. 33, 39, 51. 
27 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RON C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 18-19 (2009). 
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atrocities committed by troops under his command—by and large individuals 
were not considered criminally liable under international law. Instead, 
responsible states were liable to other states for reparations and other tort-like 
remedies. 
For the past seventy years, however, international criminal law promoters 
have been working to create enforceable individual liability for war crimes. 
They have been successful insofar as the concept of “war crimes” is now 
intertwined with individual criminal liability: indeed, many now include the 
requirement of individual liability in their definition of war crime.28 
Meanwhile, at least with regard to serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, the relevance of state responsibility has been largely 
obscured. 
A. State Responsibility in Armed Conflicts 
International law originally developed to clarify the rights and obligations 
of states with regard to other states. The law of state responsibility is one of 
international law’s core legal regimes, on par with the law of treaties or the 
sources of international legal obligations.29  
A state responsible for a violation of a legal obligation must “make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”30 
regardless of the source of the legal obligation, the entity to which it is owed, 
or the nature or seriousness of the resulting harm. International obligations 
encompass both treaty and nontreaty obligations: violations of bilateral 
agreements may seem similar to breaches of contract, while violations of 
customary or constitutive treaty obligations are more akin to torts or crimes.31 
Tthe law of state responsibility does not distinguish between potential 
wronged parties: A state may now owe an international legal obligation to 
 
28 See supra note 8. 
29 After roughly fifty years of work, in 2001 the International Law Commission published draft 
articles on the law of state responsibility, and commentaries to these articles. G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Draft 
Articles]; Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries, Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) 
[hereinafter Draft Articles Commentaries]. At present, there is no impetus to formalize these 
articles in a treaty, but they are regularly cited and relied upon by states, tribunals, and civil society 
as describing the relevant customary rules. 
30 Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 31(1); see also Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Claim for 
Indemnity, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13) (“[I]t is a principle of international law, and 
even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make 
reparation.”). An “internationally wrongful act” is “an action or omission” that is both “attributable 
to the State under international law” and “constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.” Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 2. 
31 Id. at 55. 
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individuals, another state, or the international community as a whole. Finally, 
there is no distinction “between ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ responsibility as is the 
case in internal legal systems.”32 
States incur numerous positive and negative international humanitarian 
law obligations, both in peacetime and while engaging in armed conflict.33 In 
the absence of an authoritative law enforcer, states are charged with enforcing 
these obligations: states must prevent, prosecute, and punish violations 
committed by their nationals or occurring on their territory, and states may 
even have some duties to ensure that other states comply with the Geneva 
Conventions. 
To minimize international humanitarian law violations, states must 
conduct legal reviews of new weaponry to ensure all fielded weapons are 
capable of being lawfully used. The obligation to conduct legal reviews, 
binding on all states under customary law,34 has also been codified in 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.35 States must also 
train members of their armed forces in international humanitarian law and 
disseminate the 1949 Geneva Conventions “as widely as possible.”36 
 
32 See id. at 111 (“[T]he present articles do not recognize the existence of any distinction 
between State ‘crimes’ and ‘delicts.’”). 
33 Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states, “The High Contracting Parties 
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; see also INT’L COMMITTEE 
RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/home [https://perma.cc/Q8GU-T2SM] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (describing various 
specific rules). 
34 Customary international law prohibits the use of weapons that are by nature indiscriminate 
or those that cause superfluous injury and suffering. As a result, it can be presumed that states are 
required to conduct reviews to avoid fielding unlawful weapons. See Kathleen Lewand et al., A Guide 
to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of 
Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006) [hereinafter ICRC Guide to 
Legal Review] (“The faithful and responsible application of its international law obligations would 
require a State to ensure that the new weapons, means and methods of warfare it develops or acquires 
will not violate these obligations.”). 
35 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol]. 
36 First Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 47; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 
48; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 127; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 
144. The obligation to disseminate is reiterated in the two 1977 Additional Protocols. First Additional 
Protocol, supra note 35, art. 83; Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
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Additionally, states have a duty to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute 
war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals, by their armed forces, or 
by anyone in their territory or anywhere else over which they exercise 
jurisdiction. The Geneva Conventions require state parties to search for 
individuals alleged to have committed grave breaches and either try or 
extradite them,37 and similar obligations are found in a number of other 
international humanitarian law treaties.38 In keeping with these international 
obligations, many states provide for the investigation and prosecution of war 
crimes through national legislation.39 For these and other reasons, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross has recognized states’ duty to 
prosecute war crimes as customary international law.40 
It has long been established in treaty law and international customary law 
that states are responsible for war crimes committed by members of their 
armed forces, and this legal requirement has been repeatedly upheld in case 
law.41 States party to Additional Protocol I are also responsible for their 
agents’ actions committed in excess of their delegated authority or contrary 
to instructions.42 In certain circumstances, states may also be responsible for 
war crimes committed by nonstate actors. This includes actions of individuals 
 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 19, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see also Rule 142. Instruction in International Humanitarian Law within Armed Forces, 
INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule142 [https://perma.cc/T579-V9TT] (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2016) (“States and parties to the conflict must provide instruction in international 
humanitarian law to their armed forces.”). 
37 First Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 33, 
art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 129; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 
33, art. 146. The ICRC claims that this is a customary law obligation, as the obligation to investigate 
and punish war crimes is mentioned in numerous military manuals, national legislation, and official 
statements. See Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY 
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule158 
[https://perma.cc/EMJ5-CJBJ] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
38 See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. VII(1), Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 
1974 U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]; Rome Statute, supra note 13, pmbl. 
39 See, e.g., War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012). 
40 Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter44_
rule158 [https://perma.cc/V389-H745] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
41 See Rule 149. Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter42_rule149 [https://perma.cc/2P3B-7VEP] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) 
[hereinafter ICRC Rule 149] (citing sources). 
42 See First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 91 (“A Party . . . shall be responsible for all 
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”); see also Draft Articles Commentaries, 
supra note 29, at 46. The United States, which is not party to the First Additional Protocol, maintains 
that a state is not responsible for “private” acts of its armed forces under customary law, unless it 
can be shown that there was inadequate supervision or training. See ICRC Rule 149, supra note 41. 
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or entities empowered to exercise governmental authority, actions of 
individuals or entities who act under a state’s direction or control, and actions 
of private individuals or entities which the state acknowledges and adopts as 
its own.43 
Despite being a foundational concept in international law, state 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law is at 
risk of being eclipsed by the rise of individual criminal liability. 
B. The Rise of Individual Criminal Liability 
Notwithstanding the ongoing existence of state responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, the past seventy years have 
witnessed the dramatic rise of individual liability for war crimes. This once 
nonexistent legal concept is now “the unchallenged cornerstone of the entire 
edifice of international criminal law.”44 
1. Historic Foundations 
Despite the adage about love and war, there is a longstanding desire to 
hold individuals accountable for their actions in armed conflicts. As early as 
1386, domestic laws limited what individual actions were permissible.45 U.S. 
Secretary of War William Marcy and U.S. Major General Winfield Scott 
built “a general principle of individual criminal liability for violations of the 
law of war” in late 1847.46 The 1863 Lieber Code—one of the first and most 
internationally influential codifications of the law of war—prohibited various 
activities, including “wanton violence committed against persons in the 
invaded country, all destruction of property . . . , all robbery, all pillage or 
sacking [and] all rape, wounding, maiming or killing of such inhabitants.”47  
The first treaty codification of individual criminal liability can be found 
in the work of 1874 Brussels Conference on the Rules of Military Warfare. 
Attended by fifteen countries, this Conference produced a Draft 
International Convention on the Laws and Customs of War, section III of 
which provided: 
 
43 Draft Articles, supra note 29, arts. 5, 8, 11. 
44 Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 830, 840 (2006). 
45 Greppi, supra note 10, at 531 (discussing limitations in English, Hungarian, and Swedish laws). 
46 JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 130 (2012). 
47 FRANCIS LIEBER, U.S. WAR DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES 
OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 44 (1898) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE]; see also id. art. 47 
(endorsing punishment for crimes “punishable by all penal codes,” such as arson, murder, assault, and 
rape, “if committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants”). These 
humanitarian rules, however, were often swallowed by the military necessity exception, see id. arts. 
14-16, 38, which has been characterized as “[t]he master principle that animated the code” and “a robust 
license to destroy.” WITT, supra note 46, at 234. 
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The laws and customs of war forbid not only unnecessary cruelty and acts of 
barbarism committed against the enemy; they demand also, on the part of 
the appropriate authorities, the immediate punishment of these persons who 
are guilty of these acts, if they were not caused by absolute necessity.48 
The 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty similarly attempted to establish 
individual criminal responsibility.49 Articles 227 and 228 asserted the Allied 
and Associated Powers’ right to establish military tribunals to try and punish 
the former German Emperor and other “persons accused of having 
committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.”50 However, by 
the time the Versailles Treaty entered into force, the Kaiser had relocated to 
the Netherlands, which refused to extradite him for trial.51 Nor were the 
Allies successful in prosecuting other individuals under Article 228.52 
As it marked the first time individuals were held liable for violating 
international humanitarian law, Nuremberg is commonly regarded as the 
fount of individual criminal responsibility. The Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg explicitly recognized individual criminal 
liability for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.53 
The Nuremberg trials created an important judicial precedent of holding 
individuals accountable for actions in violation of international humanitarian 
law, and shortly thereafter the U.N. General Assembly recognized the 
“Nuremberg Principles” as preexisting customary international law deserving 
of formal codification.54 The first of these Principles, codified in 1950 by the 
International Law Commission, states that “any person who commits an act 
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and 
liable to punishment.”55 
 
48 ACTES DE LA CONFÉRENCE DE BRUXELLES DE 1874: SUR LE PROJET D’UNE 
CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE CONCERNANT LA GUERRE: PROTOCOLES DES SCÉANCES 
PLÉNIÈRES, PROTOCOLES DE LA COMMISSION DÉLEGUÉE PAR LA CONFÉRENCE, ANNEXES 4 
(Paris, Librairie des publications législatives 1874). This Draft Convention was signed by fifteen 
states, but it was never ratified. 
49 See Simeon E. Baldwin, The Proposed Trial of the Former Kaiser, 29 YALE L.J. 75 (1919) 
(discussing the novelty of individual liability in international law). 
50 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles) arts. 227-28, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry’s 
T.S. 189 [hereinafter Versailles Peace Treaty]. 
51 VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 27, at 24. 
52 Id. at 24-25. 
53 Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284. 
54 G.A. Res. 95 (I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Dec. 11, 1946). 
55 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in 
the Judgment of the Tribunal, Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Second Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.2 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 181, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22. 
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Since Nuremberg, states and international organizations have codified 
specific war crimes and created obligations for domestic enforcement,56 tried 
individuals in domestic courts,57 and established a variety of international and 
hybrid criminal tribunals.58 These efforts culminated with the Rome Statute 
establishing the ICC, which entered into force on July 1, 2002.59 Unlike other 
tribunals, which are temporary institutions with retrospective jurisdiction,60 
the ICC is a permanent court with prospective jurisdiction.61 The ICC is 
meant to operate in conjunction with national courts: it can exercise 
jurisdiction only if states are unwilling or unable to carry out criminal 
proceedings against alleged perpetrators.62 
For roughly seventy years, international criminal law has been developing 
a theory of individual liability for war crimes and creating law, institutions, 
and enforcement mechanisms to give this theory teeth. While these 
enforcement mechanisms are far from perfect—the ICC in particular is often 
the subject of mockery and complaint—they are significantly more robust 
than at any other time in human history. 
2. The Performative Function of Criminal Law 
In 1865, during the American Civil War, Confederate Captain Henry 
Wirz was accused of mistreating and killing Union prisoners of war in 
violation of the laws and customs of war.63 In his defense, Wirz maintained 
that he was simply working with what he had: 
I do not think that I ought to be held responsible for the shortness of rations, 
for the overcrowded state of the prison, (which was of itself a prolific source 
of fearful mortality), for the inadequate supply of clothing, want of shelter, 
 
56 See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 46 (obligating parties to “ensure the 
detailed execution of” this Geneva Convention); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (mandating that parties 
to the treaty to “undertake to enact” domestic legislation effectuating the Genocide Convention). 
57 See, e.g., CA 40/61 Att’y Gen. of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann 16 PD 2033 (1962) (Isr.) 
(prosecuting a Nazi war criminal in Israeli domestic courts). 
58 These include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (est. 1993), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (est. 1994), and the hybrid courts in East Timor (est. 
2002), Sierra Leone (est. 2002), and Cambodia (est. 2003). 
59 Rome Statute, supra note 13. 
60 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established 
to prosecute atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia after 1991. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993). 
61 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 17. 
62 Id. 
63 JOHN MCELROY, ANDERSONVILLE: A STORY OF REBEL MILITARY PRISONS, FIFTEEN 
MONTHS A GUEST OF THE SO-CALLED SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY; A PRIVATE SOLDIER’S 
EXPERIENCE IN RICHMOND, ANDERSONVILLE, SAVANNAH, MILLEN, BLACKSHEAR AND 
FLORENCE 639-44 (1879). 
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etc., etc . . . . [I] was only the medium, or, I may better say, the tool in the 
hands of my superiors.64 
After his conviction, Captain Wirz was sentenced to death by hanging.65 
Standing on the gallows, he allegedly remarked to the officer in charge, “I 
know what orders are, Major. I am being hanged for obeying them.”66 
Why create individual criminal liability for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, especially for persons acting on behalf of a 
state or armed group? Often, members of a military are only following their 
superiors’ orders—indeed, in some cases subordinates can be severely (even 
fatally) punished by their superiors should they disobey. As evidenced by 
Captain Wirz’s experience, the creation of individual criminal liability for 
certain violations of international humanitarian law often results in soldiers 
being caught between a rock and a hard place: they are damned under 
international law if they do follow orders and participate in the commission 
of illegal acts, and they are damned by their superiors if they don’t. 
One possible reason for the recent rise of international criminal law is that 
it serves a performative function that other forms of liability do not. Tort and 
criminal law were originally understood to be two branches of the single legal 
subject of wrongs, and both aim to reinforce social norms and to deter future 
unlawful activity through sanctions.67 But whereas tort law is also concerned 
with compensating individual victims, criminal law is more focused with 
retribution and expressive justice.68 Many agree with Blackstone that crimes 
demand punishment, whereas torts usually require only recompense, in part 
because crimes “strike at the very being of society; which cannot possibly 
subsist, where actions of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity.”69 
 
64 Letter from Henry Wirz, Captain, Confederate Army, to James H. Wilson, Major General, 
Union Army (May 7, 1865), reproduced in MCELROY, supra note 63, at 639, 640. 
65 MCELROY, supra note 63, at 644. 
66 PAUL J. SPRINGER & GLENN ROBINS, TRANSFORMING CIVIL WAR PRISONS: LINCOLN, 
LIEBER, AND THE POLITICS OF CAPTIVITY 80 (2014). 
67 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE 
LAW 517 (Robert Campbell ed., 3d ed. 1869) (“All wrongs [are] in their remote consequences generally 
mischievous . . . .”). 
68 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (1991) (“Far more than tort law, the 
criminal law is a system for public communication of values.”); Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort 
Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 719-25 (2008) (discussing 
structural and normative distinctions between criminal and tort law); id. at 721 (“[N]ormally, 
compensation is the remedy, whatever the nature of the tort or wrong.”); cf. Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (1972) (discussing, in the context of rape and thievery, how criminal 
sanctions are used to prevent the conversion of property rules into liability rules). 
69 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. But see AUSTIN, supra note 67, at 196 (“All 
offences affect the community, and all offences affect individuals.”). 
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The need for expressive, post hoc justice is particularly acute in the 
context of international humanitarian law, especially as the possibility of 
enforcement through reciprocity and reprisals has diminished.70 As has been 
observed in a variety of ways, war is hell.71 And yet, even in war, there is a 
sense that certain things are not done, that certain lines cannot be crossed.72 
Historically, states enforced these norms through reciprocity and reprisals. 
Reciprocity is the idea that one side need comply with the laws of war only if 
the other side does; reprisals are proportional and responsive violations of the 
law of war intended to force the other party to a conflict to resume compliance 
with international law.73 For example, if state A tortures prisoners of war 
(POWs), state B could respond in kind, both in reciprocity and as a reprisal. 
The Lieber Code acknowledged the importance of reciprocal action: “The 
law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of 
nations, of which it is a branch.”74 Similarly, early law of war treaties often 
explicitly conditioned their requirements on reciprocal observance.75 
Today, however, reprisal against innocents, civilians, noncombatants, and 
wounded or captured soldiers has been outlawed,76 and modern international 
humanitarian law treaties have largely dispensed with the reciprocity 
requirement (and for good reason!).77 Like human rights treaties, they now 
obligate state parties’ compliance without regard to how other states act78: If 
state A tortures POWs, state B is not free to do so. 
 
70 This account implies that international criminal liability arose to fill a gap left by the decline 
of reciprocity as a means of enforcement and deterrence; others have suggested that burgeoning 
international criminal law actually displaced reciprocity and now undermines it. See Kenneth 
Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 331, 340-43 (2009) [hereinafter Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law]. 
71 See, e.g., E. E. CUMMINGS, plato told, in SELECTED POEMS BY E. E. CUMMINGS 145, 145 
(Richard S. Kennedy ed. 1944). 
72 Granted, those lines were often drawn in ways that now seem quite disturbing. See, e.g., 
JEAN-JACQUES FRÉSARD, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE ROOTS OF BEHAVIOUR IN 
WAR: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 22 (2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
icrc_002_0854.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XP6-HWVS] (“Religions themselves are the first to specify, 
more or less explicitly, that the injunction [not to kill] concerns above all our people. The others, the 
‘unbelievers,’ infidels and apostates, may be run through by the swords of men when they are not 
simply delivered up to the sword of God.”). 
73 See Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 340-43 (discussing different 
theories of reciprocity); Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365, 382-86 
(2009) (comparing and contrasting reciprocity and reprisals). 
74 LIEBER CODE, supra note 47, art. 27; see also id. arts. 61-62 (emphasizing the propriety of 
reciprocation in the context of quartering troops). 
75 Watts, supra note 73, at 367. 
76 Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 340. 
77 But see Watts, supra note 73, at 417-30 (arguing that, although the principle of reciprocity has 
softened and altered, it is still fundamental to the operation of international humanitarian law). 
78 Cf. Lea Brilmayer, From ‘Contract’ to ‘Pledge’: The Structure of International Human Rights 
Agreements, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 163 (2006). 
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Reciprocity and reprisals were effective, if draconian, deterrent and 
enforcement mechanisms.79 In the wake of their decline, there is a greater 
need to entrench norms of conduct in armed conflict and to create 
disincentives to violate them. Criminal law is well suited to this task: unlike 
tort liability, which sometimes seems to merely ascribe a price to or “license” 
certain actions, criminal law has a morally expressive element. Crimes can be 
justly punished because they are blameworthy actions; torts and breaches of 
contract are (relatively) morally neutral. 
In addition to providing an incentive to adhere to the norms of armed 
conflict, punishment of war criminals also restores dignity to victims. 
Violations of individual rights “conveys a message that the victim’s rights are 
not sufficiently important to refrain from violating them in pursuit of another 
goal,”80 and punishment of a violation rights the scales by “send[ing] the 
message that the lives and rights of victims have value.”81 Developing 
accountability mechanisms and providing remedies to victims motivated the 
U.N. General Assembly to adopt the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law.82 
The creation of criminal liability for war crimes implied the development 
of international individual criminal liability.83 As Michael Walzer famously 
observed, “If there are recognizable war crimes, there must be recognizable 
criminals.”84 While a state may be responsible for war crimes, it cannot stand 
as a criminal defendant.85 A state does not have the mens rea required for 
 
79 See, e.g., Watts, supra note 73. 
80 DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 21 (3d ed. 2015). 
81 MIND THE GAP, supra note 19, at 14. 
82 G.A. Res. 60/147, pmbl. (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Basic Principles]. 
83 In domestic law, entities like corporations may be held criminally liable. See V.S. Khanna, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (noting the 
rise in corporate criminal liability in the 1980s and 1990s). This poses a theoretical puzzle: How is 
it possible to determine the mens rea of a corporation? Different justifications have been floated, 
but many question whether it is ever appropriate to hold a corporation criminally liable. See, e.g., id. 
at 1532-34 (concluding that a modified form of corporate civil liability would be practically and 
normatively preferable to corporate criminal liability). 
84 WALZER, supra note 1, at 287. 
85 Certain members of the International Law Commission attempted, and failed, to establish 
“state crimes”—crimes for which the state would be the direct subject of criminal liability. This 
concept was eventually abandoned. Rebecca J. Hamilton, State-Enabled Crimes, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 12), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=2647425 
[https://perma.cc/SL4Z-XMC8]. But see NINA H. B. JØRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 208-33 (2000) (arguing that the concept of “state crimes” 
has never fully disappeared). See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Joseph H. H. Weiler, 
Antonio Cassese & Marina Spinedi eds., 1989) (providing an overview of the state crimes debate). 
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criminal liability, nor can it be punished with traditional criminal sanctions, 
like imprisonment or capital punishment. The Confederate States of America 
could not be hung for failure to comply with international humanitarian law; 
Captain Wirz could.86 
C. The Unnecessary Displacement of State Responsibility 
Ever since Nuremberg, and with the aim of eliminating (or at least 
stigmatizing and minimizing) war crimes, international criminal law 
proponents have been working to create and strengthen an international legal 
regime that holds individuals accountable for war crimes they commit or 
could have prevented. While the development of international criminal law 
is laudable, the tendency of some to treat individual criminal accountability 
as the sole remedy to violations of international humanitarian law is a 
mistake.87 Although certain war crimes may be committed by individuals, 
wars “are fought between political communities and by groups.”88 Focusing 
on individual criminal liability tends to obscure the fact that states remain 
legally responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.89 
The law of state responsibility is rarely discussed or enforced with regard 
to serious violations of international humanitarian law, even though most 
such violations would be more appropriately attributed to the state than to 
individuals.90 This is hardly accidental: rather, “[t]he history of the Draft 
 
86 See Draft Articles Commentaries, supra note 29, at 111 (noting the obsolescence of the 
concept of “international crimes of state”). But see JØRGENSEN, supra note 85, at 167-207 (arguing 
that states should be held criminally responsible under a criminal organization model or a corporate 
crime model and sanctioned with declaratory judgments and punitive damages). 
87 See Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 346 (“[T]he attention 
focused by international criminal law on individual criminal liability has the unintended 
consequence of reducing attention to the rest of the laws of war—the corpus of the laws of war not 
devoted to liability at all, let alone criminal liability for individuals.”). 
88 Id. at 346. 
89 See, e.g., JØRGENSEN, supra note 85, at 27 (“[I]ndividual criminal responsibility under 
international law for acts of state became well established while state criminal responsibility, 
although a key issue, was increasingly viewed as an unworkable concept, and consequently took a 
back seat.”); Laurel E. Fletcher, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Transitional Justice and the Effacement of 
State Accountability for International Crimes, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 447, 447 (2016) (observing that 
“[t]he rise of international criminal law is celebrated as an achievement of the international rule of 
law, yet its advance effectively may come at the expense of holding States accountable for their role 
in mass violence”); Hamilton, supra note 85 (arguing that international criminal law inappropriately 
bifurcates state and individual responsibility for war crimes); André Nollkaemper, Introduction to 
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 5 (Harmen van der Wilt & André Nollkaemper 
eds., 2009) (discussing how “[t]he emphasis on individual responsibility obscures a basic truth about 
war crimes,” namely, that they are often fostered by the controlling collective entity). 
90 See Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 347 (“The whole body of 
law [of war] covers many matters which are not, on their surface, very usefully made a matter of 
individual criminal liability.”). 
2016] War Torts 1365 
Articles [of State Responsibility] illustrates how States jealously policed the 
boundaries of international criminal accountability. They curtailed 
acknowledgement that States may commit acts categorized as international 
crimes with the formal legal opprobrium that comes with criminal 
responsibility.”91 This differing level of commitment to ensuring 
accountability for individuals and states is reflected by the differing 
institutional enforcement mechanisms: 
While [international criminal law] is salient in the public imagination, with 
a list of shiny new institutions that have facilitated its rise to prominence, the 
law of State responsibility has been developing with comparatively little 
fanfare. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and regional human rights 
courts have jurisdiction over the law of State responsibility for international 
crimes. But these mechanisms face significant limitations, both legal and 
political, when it comes to the adjudication of the State’s role . . . .92 
There is no need for international criminal law to eclipse the law of state 
responsibility. Not only can the two legal regimes symbiotically coexist,93 but 
a better understanding of their respective strengths would allow them to 
augment and support each other. Consider Captain Wirz’s trial for POW 
camp conditions. If he had truly been doing the best with what he had, it was 
unjust to brand him a war criminal—doing so actually detracts from the moral 
legitimacy of international criminal law. Instead, the Confederate States 
should have been held responsible and required to make reparations. If, 
however, Captain Wirz took a sadistic glee in torturing and killing Union 
prisoners, it was appropriate to hold him personally responsible for war 
crimes. Nor are these two possibilities mutually exclusive: Captain Wirz 
could be charged and punished for his war crimes, and the Confederate States 
could be held responsible both for camp conditions and to the extent the 
States enabled his crimes.94 
*      *      * 
 
91 Fletcher, supra note 89, at 475. 
92 Hamilton, supra note 85, at 17; see also Fletcher, supra note 89, at 460 (“[W]e have a fully 
articulated system of international criminal law, while there is no parallel system to enforce State 
responsibility for the same violations.”). 
93 In the Geneva Conventions, state responsibility is recognized as existing in conjunction 
with individual criminal responsibility. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 51; Second 
Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 52; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 131; Fourth 
Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 148. 
94 Cf. Hamilton, supra note 85 (arguing for the recognition of “state-enabled crimes”—crimes 
that could not have occurred without the state playing an integral role). 
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The rise of individual criminal responsibility has had the unfortunate side 
effect of eclipsing the role of the law of state responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. Institutions for holding 
individuals accountable for war crimes have flowered, while institutional 
approaches to holding states accountable for their internationally wrongful 
acts in armed conflicts have stagnated. Although some have expressed 
concern at this apparent tradeoff,95 up until now it has not been obviously 
problematic. Because they may take unpredictable action, however, 
autonomous weapon systems break the causal chain necessary for individual 
criminal liability and thereby highlight the relative lack of institutional means 
of holding states responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. 
II. THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 
Science fiction writers have long hypothesized that autonomous weapon 
systems may destroy human values, human independence, or even all of 
humanity—for the purposes of this Article, I am merely concerned with the 
threat they pose to international criminal law. Autonomous weapon systems 
challenge a presumption that undergirds all of international criminal law: that 
serious violations of international humanitarian law will not occur absent 
willful human action. In situations where no one acts intentionally or 
recklessly, under current law no one—not the deployer, commander, 
programmer, developer, manufacturer, or the weapon system itself—can (or 
should) be held criminally liable for the deadly consequences of an 
autonomous weapon systems’ unanticipated actions. 
A. Introducing Autonomous Weapon Systems 
Autonomous weapon systems “have been described as the third revolution 
in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms.”96 A former U.S. Major 
General states that “[f]ull lethal autonomy is no mere next step in military 
strategy: It will be the crossing of a moral Rubicon.”97 The conglomerate 
nongovernmental organization Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was formed 
 
95 See, e.g., id. 
96 Stuart Russell, Take a Stand on AI Weapons, 521 NATURE 415, 415 (2015). 
97 Robert H. Latiff & Patrick J. McCloskey, With Drone Warfare, America Approaches the Robo-
Rubicon, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2013, 7:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788
7324128504578346333246145590 [https://perma.cc/C67E-SKNP]. 
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recently for the sole purpose of promoting a ban on such weaponry.98 But 
what are autonomous weapon systems, and what makes them so terrifying? 
1. The Killer Robots Are Here 
An “autonomous weapon system” is “a weapon system that, based on 
conclusions derived from gathered information and preprogrammed 
constraints, is capable of independently selecting and engaging targets.”99 
Unlike the semi-autonomous drones in use today, which may have some 
autonomous functions but are essentially remotely piloted bombers, 
autonomous weapon systems can operate without a human “in” or “on” the 
loop.100 Autonomous weapon systems should also be distinguished from 
automated weapons, like rudimentary landmines or trip-wire sentry guns. In 
contrast to these purely reactive systems, autonomous weapon systems gather 
and process data from their environment to reach independent conclusions 
about how to act.101 
Autonomous weapon systems are far from fictional or futuristic: several 
countries are already fielding weapon systems with varying levels of 
autonomy and lethality.102 For example, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis control system, 
operated in conjunction with U.S. Phalanx Close In Weapons Systems 
(CIWS), provides a last-ditch defense against anti-ship missiles and 
aircraft.103 Aegis has four modes, the last of which presumes that all human 
operators are incapacitated and independently identifies and engages 
incoming threats.104 The navies of at least thirty states are currently using 
Aegis/CIWS and similar systems.105 The South Korean SGR-A1 is a 
stationary, armed robot used to monitor the demilitarized zone. Allegedly, it 
has an operating mode under which it can select and engage targets with no 
 
98 See About Us, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkillerrobots.
org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/CNJ8-ZRX3] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) (“[L]aunched in London 
in April 2013, the Campaign . . . work[s] to preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons.”). 
99 Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1842. 
100 See id. at 1855-63 (distinguishing between autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems). 
101 See id. at 1855-56 (distinguishing between autonomous and automated weapon systems and 
discussing the difficulty and usefulness of drawing a line in the sand between them). 
102 See, e.g., id. at 1868-72 (describing existing autonomous weapon systems). 
103 John Pike, MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-15.htm [https://perma.cc/QW9Y-MXMV] (last 
updated Jan. 9, 2003). 
104 See Marchant et al., supra note 6, at 287 (describing this “casualty” setting of the Aegis, 
according to which the system “does what it thinks is necessary to save the ship”). 
105 Paul Scharre & Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems 
12 (Feb. 13, 2015) (unpublished working paper), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02.pdf [https://perma.cc/P422-K2XW]. 
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human oversight (although it does not appear to be used in that mode).106 
The Israeli Harpy Loitering Weapon is an airborne weapon designed to 
identify and destroy enemy radar emitters.107 Unlike most fire-and-forget 
missiles, “[t]he person launching the Harpy does not known [sic] which 
particular radars are to be engaged, only that radars that meet the Harpy’s 
programmed parameters will be engaged.”108 Instead, it independently selects 
and attempts to destroy targets. Russia and China are both employing PMK-2 
encapsulated torpedo mines, “a type of sea mine that, when activated by a 
passing ship, instead of exploding, open [sic] a capsule which then releases a 
torpedo that engages a target.”109 For practical and strategic reasons, the vast 
majority of autonomous weapon systems in use today are being employed 
with human supervision, but they are nonetheless capable of independently 
selecting and engaging targets.110 
Both advocates and critics of a ban on autonomous weapon systems often 
assume that such weaponry does not yet exist.111 If these writers are discussing 
what they term “fully” autonomous weapon systems—usually defined as 
weapon systems with human-level cognitive capabilities or ones that are not 
capable of being controlled by a human operator—their assessment is correct. 
Artificial intelligence has not advanced to the point that robots have human-
level cognition, and militaries have not fielded weapons that are incapable of 
being controlled (nor are they ever likely to do so). But while these distinctions 
are important in designing regulations, they are irrelevant to the question of 
whether a weapon system is autonomous. If a weapon has the capability to 
 
106 Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/sgr-a1.htm [https://perma.cc/9PJ8-D885] (last updated Nov. 7, 2011). 
107 Harpy Loitering Weapon, ISR. AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES, www.iai.co.il/2013/36663-45984-
EN/Groups.aspx [https://perma.cc/YK3G-YB5B] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
108 Paul Scharre, Autonomy, “Killer Robots,” and Human Control in the Use of Force—Part I, JUST 
SECURITY (July 9, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://justsecurity.org/12708/autonomy-killer-robots-human-
control-force-part [https://perma.cc/EE2E-J57B]. 
109 Id. 
110 See Werner J.A. Dahm, Killer Drones Are Science Fiction, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2012), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204883304577221590015475180 [https://perma.cc/3X2P-XG
ZQ] (“[I]t’s not technology that has held us back from fully autonomous military strikes—from a purely 
technical perspective, it has been possible for some time to conduct them.”). 
111 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW 
SCH., LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 46 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUQ8-WKYH] (“Although 
fully autonomous weapons do not exist yet, technology is rapidly moving in that direction.”); 
Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law 
of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 231, 234 (2013) (“[A]n outright ban is premature since 
no such weapons have even left the drawing board.”). 
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independently select and engage targets, whether it does so is a question of how 
it is used, not whether autonomous weapon systems exist.112 
2. . . . And More Are Coming 
Classically, militaries have had little use for unpredictable weapons or 
ones that could not be controlled,113 doomsday device arguments 
notwithstanding.114 In fact, many attribute the success of bans on chemical 
and biological weapons to their indiscriminate nature—not because 
indiscriminate weapons are unlawful, but rather because they endanger one’s 
own troops and therefore are a less preferable option.115 Similarly, some have 
argued that military codes, rules of engagement, and even international 
humanitarian law developed as commanders attempted to better control the 
most autonomous of weapons—human beings.116 Because of the military’s 
interest in foreseeable results, one may credibly suggest that states will have 
little incentive to develop, let alone deploy, potentially unpredictable 
autonomous weapon systems.117 For example, the South Korean Super aEgis 
II, a gun-toting stationary robot, was originally designed to fire 
 
112 See Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1861-62 (distinguishing between autonomous 
capability and autonomous use). 
113 Indiscriminate weapons are those which cannot be directed at a military objective or those 
whose effects cannot be controlled. There is a customary international law prohibition on the fielding 
of indiscriminate weapons, see Rule 71. Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate, INT’L COMMITTEE 
RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20_rule71 [https://perma.cc/H4KG-BFMG] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016), 
which serves both a humanitarian and practical purpose. 
114 A “doomsday device” is any technology that could destroy all life on a planet or the planet 
itself; its usefulness depends largely on its capability to deter war. Much of the Cold War military 
strategy depended on this risk of mutually assured destruction, and many classics of science fiction 
are grounded on this concept. See, e.g., MORDECAI ROSHWALD, LEVEL 7 (1959); KURT 
VONNEGUT, CAT’S CRADLE (1963); DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP 
WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964). 
115 See, e.g., Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 939, 992 n.199 (1998) (“According to ‘realists,’ the international community bans 
weapon systems only after discovering them to be largely ineffective or obsolete . . . .”). The United 
States, for example, unilaterally renounced its biological weapons research after concluding they 
were of limited military effectiveness. Bonnie Docherty, The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for 
a Cluster Munitions Convention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 60 (2007). 
116 See generally Eyal Benvenisti & Amichai Cohen, War is Governance: Explaining the Logic of 
the Laws of War from a Principle–Agent Perspective, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1363 (2014). 
117 See ARTICLE 36, KEY AREAS FOR DEBATE ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS 2 (2014) 
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/A36-CCW-May-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3MLN-WCEY] [hereinafter ARTICLE 36 BRIEFING PAPER] (“No state is likely to argue in favour 
of the release of [autonomous weapon systems] without any form of human control whatsoever 
. . . .”); see also DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, at 2, 3 (requiring that autonomous weapon 
systems are “designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human 
judgment over the use of force” and suggesting that only “[h]uman-supervised” autonomous weapon 
systems may be employed). 
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autonomously.118 The design was technologically feasible, but in response to 
customer requests, the manufacturer added two levels of human oversight.119 
Despite the possibility of unpredictable action, autonomous weapon 
systems promise a seductive combination of distance, accuracy, and 
lethality—in part because they are capable of acting independently.120 
Increased distance between soldiers and targets reduces risk to troops,121 but 
historically this benefit came at the cost of accuracy,122 which in turn 
demanded an increase in lethal force.123 Archers and bombardiers are safer 
than foot soldiers and ground troops, but a foot soldier’s sword or firearm is 
more accurate than an arrow or bomb. To accomplish similar combat 
objectives at greater distances, early militaries increased the number of 
archers; later ones increased the number of bombs dropped in a given attack 
and their destructive power, with devastating effects for civilians. Only 
recently has weapons technology advanced to a point that distant weapons 
may also be extremely accurate.124 Precision-guided munitions presented the 
prospect of relatively risk-free warfare, and remotely operated drones 
extended this possibility to today’s asymmetric conflicts. Improved accuracy 
has reduced the need for lethality,125 which has had a beneficial side effect for 
civilians. As weapon systems become more accurate and require less lethal 
force for effectiveness,126 what is considered a “proportionate” level of 
 
118 Simon Parkin, Killer Robots: The Soldiers That Never Sleep, BBC (July 16, 2015), http://www.
bbc.com/future/story/20150715-killer-robots-the-soldiers-that-never-sleep [https://perma.cc/Q9A6-WLJ5]. 
119 Id. 
120 See Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1, 30 
(2015) (describing these as the “three main considerations” in the context of weapons development). 
121 See id. at 30-33 (discussing the inverse relationship between proximity of the victim and the 
trauma of the kill). 
122 See id. at 34 (“An inverse relationship exists between distance and accuracy.”); cf. Michael 
N. Schmitt, War, Technology, and the Law of Armed Conflict, 82 INT’L L. STUD. 137, 146 (2006) 
(“Accuracy is the ability of a weapon to strike a specified location, known as the aimpoint. Precision, 
by contrast, involves identifying targets in a timely fashion and striking them accurately.”). 
123 See Gross, supra note 120, at 34. 
124 See id. at 41 (“The shift to precision weapons has its origins in the Korean War and, even 
more so, in the experience of the Vietnam war . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
125 See id. at 39 (explaining the tradeoff between accuracy and lethality in that “making each 
[inaccurate] projectile more lethal improved the chances that even if the target were not hit directly 
it would destroyed”). 
126 See id. at 48 (“[G]reater overall accuracy meant that smaller, less-lethal munitions could be 
used. Greater precision and smaller armaments, in turn, brought a potential reduction in collateral 
damage.”); Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre, Do Killer Robots Save Lives?, POLITICO (Nov. 19, 
2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/11/killer-robots-save-lives-113010.html#. 
VZ6QAflVhBc [https://perma.cc/ZG92-SVYK] (discussing the role of precision-guided munitions 
in reducing civilian casualties). 
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collateral damage has narrowed dramatically.127 In World War II, for example, 
Great Britain and the United States targeted civilian population centers as 
part of their overarching strategic plan;128 today, any civilian death associated 
with a drone strike raises the question of whether the strike was unlawful, 
prompting some to question whether states are now obligated to use the most 
precise weapons in their arsenals.129 Autonomous weapon systems promise an 
appealing next-generation combination of distance, accuracy, and lethality—
but at the cost of some unpredictability. 
Additional financial, strategic, political, and moral incentives encourage 
state investment in autonomous weapon systems.130 In certain situations—
when superhuman reaction time is necessary, in harsh environments, or on 
effectively suicidal missions—autonomous weapon systems are uniquely 
effective.131 They tackle dull, dirty, and dangerous tasks without complaint132 
and reduce the number of human soldiers exposed to physically and 
psychologically hazardous environments.133 They cut personnel costs, both 
because they will substitute for human soldiers and because a single 
supervisor can monitor multiple systems.134 Autonomous weapon systems are 
less subject to jamming or takeover than their remotely-operated, semi-
autonomous equivalents, and they are faster learners and more likely to follow 
 
127 The customary jus in bello proportionality requirement prohibits any attack in which injury 
to civilians and civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. 
See First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 51(5)(b) (codifying the customary law). 
128 Matthew Lippman, Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: Technology and 
Terror from World War I to Afghanistan, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 15-16 & n.143 (2002). 
129 See, e.g., Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 344; Gross, supra note 
120, at 60; Christopher B. Puckett, In This Era of “Smart Weapons,” Is a State Under an International Legal 
Obligation to Use Precision-Guided Technology in Armed Conflict?, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 645 (2004). 
130 See Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1865-68 (discussing additional incentives favoring 
the development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems). 
131 An official at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has observed that human 
beings are becoming “the weakest link in defense systems.” P. W. Singer, Robots at War: The New 
Battlefield, WILSON Q., Winter 2009, at 30, 37; see also Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1891 
(observing that autonomous weapon systems are both “highly effective in certain circumstances” 
and that “many of the objectives accomplished by autonomous weapon systems could not be similarly 
achieved by other means”). 
132 Dean Irvine, Doing Military’s Dangerous, Dull and Dirty Work, CNN (Feb. 16, 2012, 2:23 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/business/singapore-airshow-drones/ [http://perma.cc/R9G6-D8C9]. 
133 This is both a moral and political benefit. As a Navy chief petty officer noted on the loss of 
his unit’s PackBot, “[W]hen a robot dies, you don’t have to write a letter to its mother.” Singer, supra 
note 131, at 31. 
134 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP FY 2013–2038, at 
25 (2013), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/DOD-USRM-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK36-25TV] 
[hereinafter DOD ROADMAP] (“[S]trides in autonomy . . . have reduced the number of personnel 
required, but much more work needs to occur.”). 
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orders than their human counterparts.135 Because their evaluations of a 
situation will not be affected by human emotions (like anger or fear), human 
frailties (like fatigue or boredom), or human prejudices (like racism or 
scenario fulfillment), autonomous weapon systems may be more humane than 
human soldiers.136 
Meanwhile, many of the concerns raised about autonomous weapon 
systems—that they might destabilize the security environment by encouraging 
an arms race or by making it easier to use force, or that they may increase risk to 
civilians by undermining important customary humanitarian protections137—are 
deeply unsettling, but far less immediate and concrete. As a result, while states 
acknowledge the risks this new weaponry might eventually pose to the international 
order, they are unlikely to negotiate or implement an effective ban.138 With few 
exceptions, states express interest in continued discussions of regulation139—while 
 
135 As Paul Scharre points out, following orders to the letter is precisely the “quality that makes 
[robotic systems] both reliable and maddening [as, u]nlike humans, autonomous systems lack the 
ability to step outside their instructions and employ ‘common sense,’ adapting to the situation at 
hand.” SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 6. Readers of Isaac Asimov have long been familiar with this 
conundrum. See, e.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround, in I, ROBOT 25 (1950). 
136 RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 29-30 (2009). 
137 For a discussion of how the increased deployment of autonomous weapon systems might 
make war politically easier and thereby affect the balance of the U.S. war power, see Rebecca 
Crootof, War, Responsibility, and Killer Robots, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. 909 (2015). 
138 See, e.g., KENNETH ANDERSON & MATTHEW WAXMAN, HOOVER INST., LAW AND 
ETHICS FOR AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: WHY A BAN WON’T WORK AND HOW THE 
LAWS OF WAR CAN (2013), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Anderson-
Waxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/J682-YJ9W]; Crootof, Killer Robots, 
supra note 4, at 1891-93 (arguing that only one of eight traits associated with successful bans holds 
with respect to the enactment of a ban of autonomous weapon systems). 
139 The few states that have explicitly called for a ban on “fully” autonomous weapon systems—Algeria, 
Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, the Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, the 
state of Palestine, and Zimbabwe—are hardly military or technological powerhouses; the Holy See doesn’t 
even have armed forces. CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, COUNTRY VIEW ON KILLER ROBOTS 
(2016), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CountryViews_14Apr2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/48G4-CWEY]. China and the United States have refrained from taking firm stances, but they are 
generally in favor of continued international discussions. See, e.g., Michael W. Meier, U.S. Dep’t of State, 2014 
Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva (Nov. 
13, 2014), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/11/13/u-s-statement-at-the-meeting-of-high-contracting
-parties-to-the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons-ccw/ [http://perma.cc/S2J6-9WYX] 
(“[The United States] see[s] value in the constructive and open discussions [it] ha[s] already had . . . in recent 
years.”); Wu Haitao, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy 
Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Orgs. 
in Switz., Statement at the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, Geneva (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/
CD0B8EF0EF22A565C1257D97003D639F/$file/China_MSP_GS.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTE6-E4XG] 
(“China supports further discussions on the issue . . . to carry out in-depth study on relevant aspects of the 
issue . . . .”). Russia, in contrast, has expressed “severe doubts” about the usefulness of continuing an 
international discussion on autonomous weapon systems. See CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, 
REPORT ON ACTIVITIES: CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ANNUAL MEETING OF HIGH 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, 3-4 (2014), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/
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they continue to pour money into developing increasingly autonomous 
weapon systems.140 
3. Inherent Unpredictability and Inevitable Accidents 
Autonomous weapon systems are uniquely effective at accomplishing 
certain military objectives, but they also are uniquely unpredictable. While 
the actions of autonomous weapon systems may be largely foreseeable and 
safe in most scenarios, it is impossible to guarantee that they will always 
perform as expected.141 Quite the contrary; according to “normal accident” 
theory, over a long enough time horizon, accidents are inevitable in complex 
and tightly coupled systems.142 Given their inherent unpredictability and 
their destructive capacity, autonomous weapon systems will eventually be 
involved in an accident that constitutes a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law. 
First, the sheer complexity of an autonomous weapon system’s program may 
make it impossible for human beings to predict how it will act with complete 
accuracy—or even reconstruct why it acted a certain way after the fact.143 To the 
extent autonomous weapon systems employ artificial neural networks—which 
are designed to mimic biological neural networks and take action based on varied 
kinds of inputs—the reason for the resulting action may be opaque even to the 
system’s designers.144 This issue will be exacerbated to the extent autonomous 
 
KRC_ReportCCW2014_22Dec2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AP6-HFHH] [hereinafter CSKR REPORT] 
(discussing Russia’s doubts, which noted the “further we go into discussions . . . the greater the expectations 
will be from the international community in terms of results.”). South Korea has suggested that there be no 
restrictions on weapon systems used for peaceful purposes—which it would likely apply to its robotic 
monitoring of the De-Militarized Zone. Ahn Youngjip, Permanent Mission of S. Kor. to the United Nations, 
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (May 13, 2014), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/15FD27B028D31769C1257
CD8003E25CB/$file/ROK+LAWS+2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/975Z-ZAE6]. Israel has suggested that 
autonomous weapon systems could eventually better comply with international humanitarian law than human 
soldiers. CSKR REPORT, supra, at 20. Finally, the United Kingdom has explicitly opposed a ban. Owen 
Bowcott, UK Opposes International Ban on Developing ‘Killer Robots,’ THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2015, 4:34 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/13/uk-opposes-international-ban-on-developing-killer-robots 
[https://perma.cc/B7FX-ZLDL]. 
140 See, e.g., DOD ROADMAP, supra note 134, at 67 (identifying increasing autonomy in weapon 
systems as a “high priority”); see also Jack Browne, UAV Markets Robust Despite Declining Spending, DEF. 
ELECTRONICS (Feb. 15, 2012), http://defenseelectronicsmag.com/electronic-countermeasures/uav-
markets-robust-despite-declining-spending [https://perma.cc/3L24-Z5BQ] (discussing the stability in 
defense funding for unmanned aerial vehicles, despite cuts in most other markets). 
141 SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 17. 
142 Id. at 25.  
143 Marchant et al., supra note 6, at 284. 
144 SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 15. 
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weapon systems operate in complex and unpredictable environments,145 as all 
scenarios cannot be anticipated (let alone tested).146 
Second, autonomous weapon systems are subject to various kinds of 
malfunction and corruption. The more complex the systems’ program, the 
more opportunity there is for a “bug”—a programming error that causes an 
unanticipated or unintended result.147 System failures may result from 
unexpected interactions between different elements of the system.148 The 
human-to-system interface introduces its own set of problems that are less 
prevalent with human-to-human communication.149 For example, in 2009, 
Air France Flight 447 crashed, resulting in the deaths of all 228 individuals 
on board.150 The crash was particularly tragic, as it could have been avoided.151 
It should have been relatively easy to recover from the plane’s aerodynamic 
stall, but every time the human pilot took appropriate steps to reduce the 
stall, the alarm system—which was silent while the stall exceeded its 
parameters—went off, implying that he was taking the wrong action and 
panicking him.152 
As evidenced by the reactor meltdowns at Three Mile Island and 
Fukushima and the Apollo 13, Challenger, and Columbia accidents, normal 
accidents occur even in well-regulated, safety-conscious industries.153 Such 
incidents are even more likely in armed conflicts, where individuals are 
operating with incomplete information, there is an accelerated pace of 
interaction, and an enemy is actively attempting to sabotage the endeavor.154  
As noted above, notwithstanding their capability for unanticipated action 
and their high damage potential, autonomous weapon systems are 
increasingly being integrated into states’ armed forces. While states will 
attempt to limit the risk that these systems will act in unforeseeable ways, it 
 
145 Id. at 11. 
146 Id. at 14. 
147 Id. at 13 (“[I]n systems with millions of lines of code, some errors are inevitable.”). 
148 Id. (observing that “[v]erifying all possible combinations of the internal workings of the 
system becomes increasingly difficult as the system’s complexity increases”). The 2010 flash crash—
during which the U.S. stock market lost trillions of dollars in roughly a half-hour due in part to 
interactions between algorithmic trading orders—exemplifies this problem. 
149 M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction (Mar. 20, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing situations where miscommunications in 
human-to-system interfaces resulted in unanticipated and preventable accidents). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 25-30 (discussing these examples). 
154 Id. at 34. Additionally, there is a risk that autonomous weapon systems will be hacked, 
spoofed, or otherwise “tricked” into performing certain actions. Id. at 15. While this last point may 
result in an autonomous weapon system acting in an unpredictable manner from the deployer’s 
perspective, this is a different kind of unpredictably problem. 
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will be impossible to accurately predict how a weapon system will act in all 
possible situations—creating a new accountability gap. 
B. No Individual Criminal Liability 
Autonomous weapon systems will inevitably commit a serious violation 
of international humanitarian law without any human being acting 
intentionally or recklessly. Absent such willful human action, no one can—or 
should—be held criminally liable. 
1. The Willful Action Requirement 
Under international law and most domestic legal regimes, war crimes 
must be committed “willfully.”155 Depending on the type of violation, a 
prosecutor must demonstrate that the accused acted with the intent to 
commit the violation or acted recklessly.156 In its Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols, the ICRC states that acting willfully includes acting 
with “wrongful intent” or “recklessness,” which it describes as “the attitude of 
an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the 
possibility of it happening.”157 The ICRC distinguishes this from “ordinary 
negligence or lack of foresight,” which occurs “when a man acts without 
having his mind on the act or its consequences (although failing to take 
necessary precautions, particularly failing to seek precise information, 
constitutes culpable negligence punishable at least by disciplinary 
sanctions).”158 
Some treaties specify the required mental element for particular war 
crimes. Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 includes in its 
list of grave breaches the “wilful killing [of prisoners of war], torture or 
 
155 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 30(1) (“[A] person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment . . . only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge.”); see also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 152 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FG6-WZRE] (“[T]he mens rea constituting all 
the [grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions] includes both guilty intent and recklessness which 
may be likened to serious criminal negligence.”). 
156 There is already an inherent moral tension in holding an individual who acted with direct 
intent and one who acted recklessly equally culpable. Jens David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Stance: 
Autonomous Weapons on the Battlefield, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 24-27 (2016). Ohlin suggests that this 
tension might be alleviated by introducing a graduated scheme of criminal offenses; while this would 
solve the intentional/recklessness problem, there are additional reasons to be wary of importing 
negligence into criminal law. See infra subsection II.B.4. 
157 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 994; see also Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-
T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 437, 439 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5AX-3ZXB]. 
158 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 994 (citations omitted). 
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inhuman treatment, including biological experiments” and “wilfully 
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in 
[the] Convention.”159 Article 85(3) of the First Additional Protocol of 1977 
similarly criminalizes certain actions, such as launching indiscriminate attacks 
against civilians, provided that they are committed willfully.160 Where the 
requisite mental element is not codified, international courts and tribunals 
have often imputed a mental element based on the nature of the violation. In 
such circumstances, individuals have been held criminally liable only if they 
acted intentionally or recklessly.161 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute extends the willful standard to all serious 
violations of international humanitarian law: “Unless otherwise provided, a 
person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.”162 Intent to commit an action requires 
evidence that the accused “means to engage in the conduct”;163 intent to 
produce a consequence requires evidence that the accused “means to cause 
that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.”164 “Knowledge,” meanwhile, entails “awareness that a circumstance 
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”165 
2. No Direct Individual Liability 
Under international criminal law, individuals are responsible for war 
crimes they commit or are directly involved in committing, which might 
include planning or ordering the criminal act. Given the willfulness 
requirement, no one can currently be held directly liable for the independent 
and sometimes unpredictable actions of an autonomous weapon system. 
Certainly, an individual who intentionally programmed an autonomous 
weapon system to commit a serious violation of international humanitarian 
law could be prosecuted for a war crime, as could one who recklessly deployed 
an autonomous weapon system incapable of discriminating between lawful 
 
159 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 130. 
160 First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 85(3). 
161 CASSESE, supra note 8, at 76; see also KNUT DÖRMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES 
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND 
COMMENTARY 43 (2003) (“It may be concluded from the cases rendered by the ad hoc Tribunals 
that the notion ‘wilfull’ includes ‘intent’ and recklessness’, but excludes ordinary negligence.”). 
162 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 30(1) (emphasis added). 
163 Id. art. 30(2)(a). 
164 Id. art. 30(2)(b). 
165 Id. art. 30(3). 
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and unlawful targets in an urban area.166 A commander who ordered that an 
autonomous weapon system be used inappropriately would also be directly 
liable for its actions, and a commander who became aware that an autonomous 
weapon system had been used or was about to be used to commit a war crime 
but who took no action to prevent or punish the violation would be indirectly 
criminally liable.167 Those are the easy cases. 
This Article focuses instead on the hard case: whether anyone might be held 
accountable in the more complicated situation where no individual acts 
intentionally or recklessly, but an autonomous weapon system nonetheless takes 
action that constitutes a serious violation of international humanitarian law. 
At present, there is little sense in attempting to hold autonomous weapon 
systems themselves liable. Artificial intelligence has not advanced to a point 
where a robotic system could be said to act intentionally or recklessly. If a 
violation of international humanitarian law is not a war crime absent some 
willful action, autonomous weapon systems are currently incapable of 
committing war crimes.168 Additionally, traditional justifications for individual 
liability in criminal law—deterrence, retribution, restoration, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation—do not map well from human beings to robots.169 
Some analogize autonomous weapon systems to more conventional 
weapons, others to human soldiers. Either way, if no person acts willfully, no 
person can be held directly criminally liable. If an autonomous weapon 
system is merely another weapon in a state’s arsenal, its deployer will be liable 
only if she intended or foresaw the reasonable likelihood of civilian harm and 
nonetheless used the weapon system. If instead it is analogized to a soldier 
going rogue, the deployer could be held directly liable only for actions that 
resulted in serious violations if she ordered or otherwise directly contributed 
to the execution of that unlawful action. Similarly, regardless of the analogy, 
the commanding officer and the weapon system’s programmers, designers, or 
manufacturers could be held directly responsible only to the extent they 
 
166 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Examining Autonomous Weapon Systems from a Law of Armed Conflict 
Perspective, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 213, 225 (Hitoshi Nasu 
& Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014). 
167 Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 111, at 277. 
168 Additionally, international criminal tribunals’ jurisdiction is generally limited to “natural 
persons,” which would prevent bringing suit against a weapon system. MIND THE GAP, supra note 
19, at 19. Presumably, however, should autonomous weapon systems eventually have human-like 
cognitive capabilities such that they could act intentionally and punishment might serve as a form 
of deterrence, tribunals’ jurisdiction could be expanded to include entities with artificial intelligence. 
169 But see GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER 
CRIMINAL LAW (2013) (arguing that robots can be held criminally liable and punished, much like 
human beings and corporations). 
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willfully contributed to the crime’s commission.170 Assuming no one intended 
the violation or acted recklessly, no one can be held directly liable.171 
3. No Indirect Individual Liability 
In certain circumstances, military commanders and civilian superiors may 
be held indirectly criminally liable for a subordinate’s crime. The customary 
doctrine of “superior responsibility” or “command responsibility” has been 
codified differently in different international agreements, but it is generally 
understood that a superior may be liable if she exercises effective control over 
a subordinate, knows of or has reason to know of the subordinate’s actual or 
intended criminal acts, and fails to take necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent or punish them.172 
This doctrine grew from the desire to address a particular kind of guilt: 
the failure to act to prevent a war crime or the failure to deter others from 
acting similarly by punishing those who do commit war crimes. Given this 
purpose, the main elements of this indirect form of liability—a subordinate 
who commits a criminal and chargeable offense, effective control, actual or 
constructive knowledge, and failure to act—are sensible. If there was no 
underlying crime, there was nothing to prevent. If a superior does not 
exercise effective control over another or does not know or have reason to 
know of that person’s potential unlawful conduct, she could not have 
prevented that individual from acting. Finally, if the superior could have 
averted or discouraged unlawful actions, either by preventing or punishing 
the subordinate, and chooses not to, she implicitly condones and thus perhaps 
even surreptitiously encourages others to act similarly. 
Because the doctrine of indirect liability is premised on an individual’s 
omissions or failure to fulfill a duty, it has an unusual mental element, in that 
 
170 For a more in-depth analysis of obstacles to direct criminal liability for developers, see Tim 
McFarland & Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons Systems Be 
Liable for War Crimes?, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 361 (2014). 
171 Mind the Gap suggests an additional practical problem: even if operators, programmers, and 
manufacturers could be held directly liable for the subsequent actions of an autonomous weapon 
system, it would be difficult to determine which one was responsible for the orders that resulted in the 
violation. And, of course, each entity would attempt to shift blame to the others. MIND THE GAP, supra 
note 19, at 20. But courts regularly deal with such questions of fact in criminal and tort law; this is 
hardly an insurmountable obstacle to prosecution were a direct liability regime to be created. 
172 See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(3), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
145; Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 28; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
art. 6(3), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598; Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia art. 7(3), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192; First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, arts. 
86-87; see also Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 346 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116
_judg_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5AX-3ZXB] (applying the doctrine of command responsibility). For 
a summary of the development of this customary rule, see CASSESE, supra note 8, at 182-87.  
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a showing of something less than intentional or reckless action may be 
sufficient to establish guilt.173 In one extreme situation, a commander was 
held strictly liable for his subordinates’ actions,174 but this approach has since 
been rejected.175 Today, tribunals tend to apply something akin to a gross or 
culpable negligence standard when evaluating if superiors are indirectly liable 
for their subordinates’ crimes.176 
This doctrine was never meant to create a fully independent source of 
liability; it rests on the assumption that there can only be indirect liability for 
failure to prevent or punish a criminal action for which someone else is 
directly liable. As a result, the elements currently required for indirect 
liability do not map well onto a situation where no human being acts 
intentionally or recklessly. 
First, superiors are responsible for a failure to prevent or punish only 
those actions that constitute chargeable criminal offenses (regardless of 
whether the subordinate is charged).177 But as autonomous weapon systems 
do not act willfully, they cannot be charged with a war crime.178 They are 
incapable of committing a chargeable offense. 
Second, it is not clear what would constitute “effective control” over 
autonomous weapon systems. When a commander gives a subordinate an 
order, the commander remains responsible for taking necessary precautions 
against that subordinate committing an unlawful act; he oversees the 
subordinate and can punish any violation the subordinate commits. This de 
facto control is necessary for indirect liability: de jure control alone is 
insufficient if the commander cannot prevent and punish a subordinate’s 
criminal acts.179 But it is impossible to punish an autonomous weapon system 
and difficult to prevent its unforeseeable actions. Even if a commander is 
monitoring the system in real time (which defeats an aim of developing 
 
173 See Alberto Gargani, Negligence (“[T]he negligent failure to supervise expands the mental 
element beyond intent and recklessness . . . .”), in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 433, 433-34 (Antonio Casssese ed. 2009). 
174 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (holding that, although there was no direct evidence 
linking Yamashita to his subordinates’ crimes, he failed in his duty to control, prevent, or punish his 
subordinates’ actions). 
175 See Beatrice I. Bonafé, Command Responsibility (“As the ad hoc tribunals have repeatedly 
underscored, command responsibility is not a form of strict liability.”), in OXFORD COMPANION, 
supra note 173, at 270, 271. 
176 See CASSESE, supra note 8, at 53 (“Gross negligence is clearly required by the customary 
rules on superiors’ responsibility . . . .”); id. at 76. But see Bonafé, supra note 175, at 271 (“[N]egligence 
is not a basis of liability in the context of command responsibility.”). 
177 GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 131-34 (2009). 
178 MIND THE GAP, supra note 19, at 21-22. 
179 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 197 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/
en/cel-aj010220.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PQW-WYDZ]. 
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weapons autonomy in the first place), she will be unable to call off an unlawful 
attack in situations where the system employs faster-than-human reaction 
times in response to surprising environmental conditions. Accordingly, some 
have concluded that because commanders could never exercise effective 
control over autonomous weapon systems, their usage creates a legal loophole, 
allowing commanders to authorize uses of force without having to take 
responsibility for them.180 
Third, the hard case presumes that commanders do not have actual 
knowledge of the autonomous weapon system’s actions. If the weapon system is 
operating under human oversight, the commander might gain such knowledge of 
the impending violation in real time. If she has such knowledge and does not act 
to prevent the action, the commander could be presumed to be willfully and 
directly contributing to the crime—but this is one version of the easy case.181 In 
the hard case, oversight will not necessarily provide the supervisor with sufficient 
information, time, or means to call off an unlawful action. 
The question then would be whether the commander had “reason to know 
of” the likely violation. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia has held that this standard is met only if commanders receive 
information that puts them “on notice of the risk” that is “sufficiently 
alarming to justify further inquiry.”182 Thus, at least as the law currently 
stands, “[c]ommanders cannot be held liable for negligently failing to find out 
 
180 MIND THE GAP, supra note 19, at 24; Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: 
Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 687, 701 (2012); Heather M. Roff, Killing in War: Responsibility, Liability, and Lethal 
Autonomous Robots, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR 352, 357-58 (Fritz Allhof, 
Nicholas G. Evans & Adam Henschke eds., 2013). 
Alternatively, some have suggested that the accountability problem might be solved by 
requiring that all weapons be “meaningfully controlled”: presumably, if every weapon is 
meaningfully controlled by a human being, there will always be someone accountable for its actions. 
See, e.g., MIND THE GAP, supra note 19. But even if states reach consensus on what “meaningful 
human control” actually entails, see Rebecca Crootof, The Meaning of “Meaningful Human Control,” 
30 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2705560 [https://perma.cc/L7DN-U7LE] (discussing the lack of consensus as to what 
this principle requires), such a principle will not solve the mens rea issue. A human operator might 
make an informed decision, based on sufficient information, training, and a well-tested weapon—
and an autonomous weapon system might nonetheless act in a way that results in a serious violation 
of international humanitarian law. At that point, it will be possible to identify which person or 
people were in putative control of the system—but as they cannot be held criminally liable absent 
willful action, there will still be an accountability gap. Cf. CSKR REPORT, supra note 139, at 17 
(quoting India as questioning whether “meaningful human control” is “adequate to establish [a] 
relationship between autonomy and accountability”). 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 167–170. 
182 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 297-98 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/
acjug/en/080717.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F4R-6JJF]. 
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information without having received some alarming information.”183 Aside 
from its innate capacity for unpredictable action, however, it is unclear what 
would constitute sufficiently alarming information to constitute notice of a 
risk for autonomous weapon systems: 
[W]ould knowledge of past unlawful acts committed by one robot provide 
notice of risk only for that particular robot, or for all robots of its make, 
model, and/or programming? Would knowledge of one type of past unlawful 
act . . . trigger notice of the risk of other types of unlawful acts . . . ? Would 
fully autonomous weapons be predictable enough to provide commanders 
with the requisite notice of potential risk? Would liability depend on a 
particular commander’s individual understanding of the complexities of 
programming and autonomy?184 
The fact that an autonomous weapon system has the capacity for independent 
and thus unpredictable action alone should not be sufficient to put 
commanders on notice; if that were all that were required, commanders could 
be presumed to be eternally on notice that human soldiers might commit an 
unlawful act, and there would be no need for this separate element. An 
autonomous weapon system might act predictably the vast majority of the 
time—it is impossible to predict when a normal accident may occur. 
In short, it is either difficult or impossible to apply many of the required 
elements for indirect liability—an inferior who commits a criminal and 
chargeable offense, effective control, actual or constructive knowledge—to 
situations where no human being acts willfully but an autonomous weapon 
system’s action nonetheless has tragic and disastrous consequences.185 
4. The Problems with Criminalizing Negligence 
Perhaps the most commonly proposed solution to the accountability gap 
is the idea that the doctrine of indirect responsibility can be modified to 
create liability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems.186 One of the 
most creative of these is Geoffrey Corn’s offshoot, termed “procurement 
 
183 MIND THE GAP, supra note 19, at 22. 
184 Id. at 23. 
185 Mind the Gap also notes that prosecutions based on indirect responsibility are difficult, as 
they often require state cooperation and the provision of internal military evidence. Id. at 21. Rather 
than being unique to situations involving autonomous weapon systems, this is an issue with all 
foreign and international prosecutions based on superior responsibility. 
186 See, e.g., Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Heyns Report] 
(“[A]mendments to the rules regarding command responsibility may be needed to cover the use of 
[autonomous weapon systems].”). 
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responsibility,” under which the military or civilian officials who procure 
certain weapons will be held responsible for the actions of those weapons.187 
When boiled down to the essentials, however, all of these suggestions are 
really about creating a criminal negligence standard.188 As noted above, 
because no one can be held directly liable for the actions of an autonomous 
weapon system under existing law, no one can be held indirectly liable.189 
Instead, the doctrine of superior responsibility would need to be substantially 
reworked to create liability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems.190 
Building off of the original doctrine and replacing the subordinate with an 
autonomous weapon system, this new doctrine might be expressed as: “An 
individual may be liable if she exercises effective control over an autonomous 
weapon system, knows or had reason to know of its propensity to violate 
international humanitarian law, and fails to take necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent those unlawful actions.”191 In other words, an individual 
may be liable if she negligently deploys an autonomous weapon system and 
it violates international humanitarian law.192 
Expanding the mental element for a war crime to include negligence is 
not entirely unprecedented. In 1921, the Leipzig Supreme Court found a 
captain guilty of causing “death through culpable negligence” after he passed 
on what he incorrectly believed was a superior’s order to kill all enemy 
 
187 Geoffrey S. Corn, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing the Inevitability of “Taking 
the Man Out of the Loop” 21 (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3894-
corn-understanding-the-loop-regulating-the-next [https://perma.cc/9KMQ-2VGQ]. 
188 This is not surprising, given that, in deciding indirect liability cases, courts often apply a 
mens rea standard akin to gross negligence. See supra note 176. Similarly, although he does not use 
the word, Corn’s proposed “procurement responsibility” would apply a criminal negligence standard: 
“[T]hese officials . . . will be accountable for objectively foreseeable failures of the weapon review 
and compliance validation process.” Corn, supra note 187, at 23. 
189 See supra subsection II.B.3. 
190 See Marco Sassòli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, 
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 308, 324 (2014) (arguing 
that holding a commander responsible for the actions of an autonomous weapon system would be 
more akin to direct responsibility than command responsibility). 
191 See Heyns Report, supra note 186, ¶ 78 (suggesting that, “[s]ince a commander can be held 
accountable for an autonomous human subordinate, holding a commander accountable for an 
autonomous robot subordinate may appear analogous,” and noting that this will work only if military 
commanders are “in a position to understand the complex programming of [autonomous weapon 
systems] sufficiently well to warrant criminal liability”). 
192 It is important to distinguish between recklessness and negligence. A reckless individual 
acts knowing that she risks the consequences; a negligent individual does not take sufficient 
precautions against a risk that a reasonable man would have foreseen. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 76. 
There are also varying levels of negligence. “Gross” or “culpable” negligence exists when an actor 
is aware of a risk associated with his actions but “believes that the harmful consequences of his conduct 
will not occur, thanks to the measures he has taken, or is about to take.” Gargani, supra note 173, at 433. 
“Simple,” “inadvertent,” or “mere” negligence “exists when an actor is not aware of the risk that failure 
to comply with accepted standards of conduct may bring about harmful effects . . . .” Id. 
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wounded.193 (Today, however, that same captain would likely be found guilty 
of acting with intention; killing wounded soldiers is a war crime, and 
following a superior’s orders is not a defense.) Many states criminalize 
negligent conduct resulting in human harm,194 and a few even allow for the 
domestic prosecution of war crimes committed negligently.195 
However, there is good reason to be uncomfortable with importing 
negligence—and the attendant tort-based reasoning—into criminal law.196 In 
distinguishing between tort and criminal law, John Coffee has emphasized 
that “[c]haracteristically, tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits.”197 
Where society wants to prohibit a certain behavior, tort law is problematic, as 
“there cannot be an ‘optimal’ rate of crime that is to be attained by pricing 
the subject behavior.”198 The negligence standard—which attempts to 
determine which precautions an actor should take before the marginal costs 
to the actor of taking the precautions equal the marginal benefits to the victim 
in terms of reduced expected losses—thus fits awkwardly into criminal law—
which is intended to eliminate (or at least minimize) certain activities.199 
This problem grows tenfold when applying a negligence standard to 
evaluating individual liability for war crimes.200 Unsurprisingly, in a zone 
where the killing of other human beings is sanctioned, lethal accidents 
 
193 CASSESE, supra note 8, at 54 n.30; see also German General Free, Major Gets Two Years: 
Crusius Convicted at Leipsic of Slaying Prisoners, but Stenger Is Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1921, at 2. 
194 See, e.g., U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918–19 (2012) (criminalizing 
reckless and culpable negligent acts that result in an unlawful death); MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL UNITED STATES ¶ 85(c) (rev. ed. 2012) (imposing criminal liability on an individual 
whose conduct results in another’s death if the individual “is under a duty to use due care” and 
“exhibits a lack of that degree of care of the safety of others which a reasonably careful person would 
have exercised under the same or similar circumstances”). 
195 See Practice Relating to Rule 156. Definition of War Crimes, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS 
CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/
v2_rul_rule156 [https://perma.cc/JYF5-S35B] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (noting that Azerbaijan and 
the Netherlands provide that war crimes may be committed negligently). 
196 The problems associated with eroding the line between crimes and torts are not unique to 
war crimes or to the international legal order: criminal law scholars across the world are concerned 
about overcriminalizaion. See, e.g., Lorena Bachmaier Winter, Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez & Albert 
Ruda-González, Blurred Borders in Spanish Tort and Crime (“The dominant development in 
substantive criminal law has been the disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and 
criminal law. This blurring of the border between tort and crime results not only in injustice, but 
ultimately weakens the efficacy of criminal law as an instrument of social control.”), in COMPARING 
TORT AND CRIME: LEARNING FROM ACROSS AND WITHIN LEGAL SYSTEMS 223, 223 (Matthew 
Dyson ed., 2015); see also Coffee, supra note 68. 
197 Coffee, supra note 68, at 194; see also Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach 
to Non-Fault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965). 
198  Coffee, supra note 68, at 194. 
199  Calabresi, supra note 197, at 718-19; Coffee, supra note 68, at 194-95 & n.5. 
200 Because it often employs a negligence-like standard, the doctrine of command responsibility 
is one of the more controversial aspects of international criminal law. 
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happen. As evidenced by the proportionality requirement,201 which 
essentially endorses a non-excessive amount of unintended civilian death, 
armed conflict is intended to be a dangerous activity. If an individual could 
be held criminally liable for negligent actions in war and if her commander 
would be indirectly liable for negligence, every commander would be a war 
criminal.202 
Some might think this would be a positive development; if combatants 
and commanders are criminally liable for lethal results of negligent actions, 
they may be deterred from careless action203—or even from engaging in 
warfare at all. But instead of bringing an end to all war, overcriminalization 
will undermine all of international criminal law. Prosecutions of criminal 
negligence will either appear to be driven more by politics than wrongdoing 
or will not be brought at all. In short, if everyone is a criminal, no one is.204 
Even if criminal negligence liability were formally limited to situations 
involving autonomous weapon systems, there is still a slippery slope 
problem—it is hard to justify prosecuting someone for criminal negligence 
because they deployed one kind of weapon, and not if they happened to use 
a different one that nonetheless resulted in equally disastrous consequences. 
Eventually, the negligent use of all types of weapons would be prosecuted. 
Importing negligence into criminal law would also undermine the legal 
regime’s moral legitimacy, as it would be morally unjust to hold anyone 
criminally liable for the independent and unpredictable actions of 
autonomous weapon systems. Robert Sparrow was one of the first to advance 
this argument.205 He concluded that, because no one can ethically be assigned 
liability for the actions of autonomous systems, such systems should not be 
developed or used.206 Others have expanded on Sparrow’s reasoning to argue 
that autonomous weapon systems threaten the structure of just war theory,207 
 
201 See First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 51(5)(b). 
202 Cf. John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages, 41 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1455, 1471-75 (2008) (describing the various events undergirding the hundreds of 
Foreign Claims Act (10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2012)) claims in Iraq and Afghanistan from January 2005 
through June 2006, including “checkpoint shootings, motor vehicle accidents, accidental weapon 
discharges” and “warning shots gone awry”). 
203 Cf. United States v. Kick, 7 M.J. 82, 84 (C.N.A. 1979) (suggesting that “[t]here is a special 
need in the military to make the killing of another as a result of simple negligence a criminal act” 
because “[t]he danger to others from careless acts is so great”). 
204 It may well be that “stigma is a scarce resource.” Coffee, supra note 68, at 238. 
205 See Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62 (2007). 
206 Id. at 66. 
207 Roff, supra note 180, at 353 (arguing that, because autonomous weapon systems will never be 
“truly autonomous in the philosophical sense of the word,” they are not moral agents and therefore 
threaten a cornerstone of just war theory: the moral equality of soldiers and the liability for killing). 
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that they are inherently unlawful208 or that they should be banned 
altogether.209 These writers are partially correct. It would be morally 
inappropriate to hold individuals criminally liable for the actions of an 
autonomous weapon system, at least in the hard case where no one acted 
willfully. But that does not mean this new weaponry is inherently unlawful or 
must be banned;210 instead, it suggests that we should consider alternative 
sources of accountability. 
It has taken nearly seventy years of effort to construct the current 
international criminal legal regime, and it is still capable of being derailed. 
Expanding the mens rea requirement for a war crime to include negligence 
threatens to destabilize an already shaky regime. If international criminal 
law’s practical and moral legitimacy is undermined, the humanitarian 
protections it was designed to preserve will lose one of their few enforcement 
mechanisms. 
*      *      *       
Ever since the Nuremberg judges declared that “[c]rimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced,”211 international criminal law proponents have 
sought to create and strengthen an international legal regime to hold 
individuals accountable for war crimes they commit or could have prevented. 
With the advent of autonomous weapon systems, however, it is now 
possible that serious violations of international humanitarian law may in fact 
be committed by “abstract entities” without any human being acting willfully, 
resulting in an accountability gap where no one—not the deployer, 
 
208 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Banning Autonomous Killing: The Legal and Ethical Requirement 
That Humans Make Near-Time Lethal Decisions (“[Autonomous weapon systems] would conflict with 
the historical, legal, and moral understanding that killing should be based on a good-faith 
understanding of real necessity and carried out by someone who may be held accountable for a wrong 
decision.”), in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: CHANGING ETHICAL AND LEGAL NORMS, 
FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO DRONES 224, 236 (Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue eds., 2014). 
209 MIND THE GAP, supra note 19; see also Kathleen Lawand, Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems, 
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/
2013/09-03-autonomous-weapons.htm [https://perma.cc/5MRN-99GK] (“If responsibility cannot be 
determined as required by [international humanitarian law], is it legal or ethical to deploy such systems?”). 
210 Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1881 (“Whether a weapon is per se unlawful is not, 
and has never been, based on whether an individual can be held accountable for violations following 
from its use.”). 
211 Judgement (Oct. 1, 1946), in 1 THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 
171, 223 (1947). 
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commander, programmer, developer, manufacturer, or the weapon system 
itself—can be held criminally liable. 
III. INTRODUCING “WAR TORTS” 
“War crimes” are widely recognized as serious violations of international 
humanitarian law that give rise to individual criminal liability. This Article 
proposes explicitly identifying “war torts” as serious violations of 
international humanitarian law that give rise to state responsibility. These 
categories are not mutually exclusive; the same action may simultaneously be 
a war crime and a war tort, just as an action in domestic law may be both a 
crime and a tort. 
Rather than outlining a comprehensive international tort liability regime 
akin to what has developed in international criminal law, this Part considers 
factors relevant to developing a pilot war torts regime focused on ensuring 
accountability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems. First, however, 
it is worth discussing why there is a need to recognize war torts. 
A. Why “War Torts”? 
As noted above, the law of state responsibility does not distinguish 
between treaty breaches, torts, or crimes; everything is encompassed in the 
term “internationally wrongful act,”212 and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law are merely one subset of possible internationally wrongful 
acts. Yet, with the rise of international criminal law, the language of violations 
in the context of international humanitarian law has shifted. Everything—
the civilian deaths associated with drone strikes to the downing of Malaysian 
flight MH17—is now popularly termed a “war crime.”213 
Certainly, it is easier, and more viscerally powerful, to forego the jargon of 
“internationally wrongful acts” or “serious violation of international 
humanitarian law” in favor of “war crimes.” But, as George Carlin has noted, 
“We do think in language. And so the quality of our thoughts and ideas can 
only be as good as the quality of our language.”214 Calling all serious violations 
of international humanitarian law “war crimes” contributes to the erasure of the 
role of state responsibility, implying that there cannot be a serious violation 
without a morally culpable perpetrator. We need a separate term, a different 
name, for violations where there is fault, regardless of whether or not there is 
also guilt. 
 
212 Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 2; see also Draft Articles Commentaries, supra note 29, at 55, 111. 
213 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 3 (arguing against framing the downing of flight MH17 as a war crime). 
214 George Carlin: Doin’ It Again (HBO television broadcast Mar. 23, 1990). 
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The various theories of tort law share a common assumption: that tort 
liability is grounded in a different kind of culpability than criminal law. While 
criminal law and tort law serve some of the same purposes—deterring 
undesirable actions through sanctions, holding those responsible for harm 
accountable, ingraining norms of conduct—the two legal regimes govern 
fundamentally different kinds of wrongs. 
Criminal law links legal culpability to moral culpability. As William 
Blackstone observed, “[A]s a vicious will without a vicious act is no civil 
crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no 
crime at all.”215 Absent moral culpability, justifications for punishment ring 
hollow.216 Accordingly, some states refuse to create strict liability crimes 
entirely, on the grounds that it is incompatible with the nulla poena sine culpa 
principle—that there be no punishment without guilt. 
In contrast, the economic analysis of tort law dispenses with questions of 
moral culpability entirely. It describes tort law as the product of efficiency 
and optimal deterrence, a method of cost allocation for accidents.217 Under 
this theory, tort law is an ex post attempt to determine a hypothetical ex ante 
contract (that the injurer would have made with the injuree), a reason to have 
liability rather than property rules.218 At the same time, tort law is largely 
forward-looking, insofar as it is intended to influence rational actors’ future 
behavior. 
A second theory of tort law—the corrective justice theory—views tort as 
creating remedies for harms resulting from breaches of interpersonal 
duties.219 There is a duty not to injure others in certain, legally defined ways; 
if an injury occurs, there is a duty to repair.220 This understanding of tort law 
is backwards-looking and circumstance-specific. While it is grounded in 
justice, it is a compensatory, “corrective” justice, concerned far less with 
questions of moral culpability than the retributive justice of criminal law.221 
 
215 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *21. 
216 Relatedly, the few strict liability crimes that do exist—like traffic violations—carry 
relatively low levels of social stigma. 
217 Jules Coleman, Scott Hershovitz & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of the Common Law of Torts, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/ [https://perma.cc/
6YC7-J5XB] (last updated Dec. 17, 2015) (explaining that optimal deterrence theory views the goal 
of tort law as “minimiz[ing] the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding them”). 
218 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 68. 
219 Theories of the Common Law of Torts, supra note 217. 
220 See id. (“[A]n individual has a duty to repair the wrongful losses that his conduct causes.”). 
221 See id. (“Many theorists believe that a principle of retributive justice—say, that the 
blameworthy deserve to suffer—does a good job of interpreting and justifying criminal law. Yet most 
theorists think that such a principle does a rather poor job of interpreting and justifying tort law 
(except, perhaps, for the part of tort law concerned with punitive damages).”). 
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Finally, John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have championed 
responsibility-based theories as a third theoretical option (as opposed to a 
subset of corrective justice theory).222 Under their civil recourse theory, tort 
liability “is a concrete, institutionalized, and practical form of moral 
responsibility for having wrongfully injured someone.”223 But even under this 
theory, which is self-consciously grounded in morality, injurious wrongs may 
overlap with—but are to be distinguished from—“blameworthy” wrongs.224 
In short, criminal law generally is concerned with moral wrongs, guilt, and 
prohibiting certain actions; tort law focuses on injurious wrongs, fault, and 
regulation of valuable but sometimes dangerous activities. Focusing only on 
morally blameworthy harms risks marginalizing unintended but injurious 
harms: thus, the development of a “war crimes” regime necessitates 
recognizing a corresponding “war torts” regime. 
A war torts regime would serve many beneficial purposes. It would clarify 
the applicability of the law of state responsibility in armed conflict—
specifically, the duty to make full reparations for injuries caused by 
internationally wrongful acts225—by delineating what violations are 
sufficiently serious to require reparation.226 Public recognition of state fault 
and states’ acceptance of responsibility would also entrench norms of lawful 
behavior. Looking forward, a war torts regime would hopefully deter states 
from employing means and methods of warfare that result in serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a war torts regime would help ensure 
that victims of states’ internationally wrongful actions could receive 
compensation for their injuries, which would not occur in the war crimes context. 
The fact that civilians are expected to shoulder the economic—to say nothing of 
the emotional—costs of the proportionality analysis is deeply troubling. As 
Michael Reisman has noted, 
The euphemism “collateral damage” means death and injury of 
noncombatants and destruction of their property. That term of art may 
insulate the party that has caused this damage from international criminal 
responsibility and, perhaps, moral self-doubt. It should not absolve it from a 
 
222 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Responsibility 
(distinguishing responsibility theory from corrective justice theory), in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 17, 25-26 (John Oberdiek ed. 2014). 
223 Id. at 36. 
224 See id. at 29 (“Tort law’s definitions of wrongdoing depart to some degree from full-blooded 
moral wrongs.”). 
225 Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 31. 
226 While the “serious” standard is admittedly vague, state practice would give it meaning, 
much as the “serious” standard for war crimes has been clarified through state practice, treaty 
negotiations, and international dialogue. 
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civil obligation to compensate, directly and promptly, the victims or their 
survivors, regardless of whether the actions of the damage-feasor violated the 
laws of war or merely caused “collateral damage.”227 
Nearly every system of law is grounded on the idea that harms must be 
compensated; a war torts regime would introduce an additional check on the 
use of military force228 and create a means by which states might alleviate at 
least the economic costs of their actions.229  
Not only do autonomous weapon systems highlight the need for war torts, 
they also may provide the ideal test case for developing a war torts regime. 
B. Accountability for Autonomous Weapon Systems 
In the absence of the term “war torts,” when faced with new scenarios, we 
are asking the wrong questions. Many pieces of current scholarship on the 
accountability gap are grounded on some variant of the inquiry, “Who can be 
held accountable when an autonomous weapon system commits a war crime?” 
Instead, we should be asking, “What is an appropriate liability regime for 
autonomous weapon systems?” 
The answer is, of course, it depends. When an autonomous weapon 
system is used recklessly or with the intention of committing a war crime, 
international criminal law is appropriate. But both with regard to some war 
crimes and in the hard case where no individual acts willfully, states should 
be held accountable for their war torts. 
1. Holding States Responsible 
Both entities and individuals may be liable for torts in domestic law, 
suggesting two possibilities for war tort liability: individual liability and state 
responsibility. 
 
227 Reisman, supra note 22, at 397. 
228 Upping the financial costs of military action might address the concern that, by reducing 
the human costs of war, autonomous weapon systems and other advanced military technologies make 
it “easier” for technologically-advanced states to use military force. See Crootof, War, Responsibility, 
and Killer Robots, supra note 137. 
229 Many states already voluntarily assume this responsibility in the context of armed conflicts, 
see infra subsection III.B.1, and some have argued that it should extend to all extraterritorial actions. 
For example, following a 1998 incident wherein a U.S. training flight in Italy severed a cable-car line 
and caused the death of twenty people, former marine and Senator Charles Robb called for the 
United States to compensate the victim’s families: “While compensation cannot replace the lost 
children, husbands and wives, it can demonstrate that we accept complete responsibility for their 
deaths . . . . While it may never be clear exactly which individual act caused the accident, it is clear 
that ultimate responsibility lies with the United States.” Letter from Charles S. Robb, U.S. Senator, 
to United States Senate (Mar. 10, 1999) (cited in Michael Reisman, The Incident at Cavalese and 
Strategic Compensation, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 505, 509-10 (2000)). 
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Although individual liability for international torts is recognized in some 
domestic law,230 similar individual tort liability does not exist in the 
international sphere. This is likely due to the fact that, until recently, only 
states were recognized as legal actors in the international order.231 As 
evidenced by international criminal law, however, it is now possible to 
construct a new legal regime grounded on individual liability. That being 
acknowledged, it seems both more likely and normatively preferable to hold 
states, rather than individuals, accountable for the actions of autonomous 
weapon systems.232 
At the practical level, not only is the state in the best position to ensure 
that autonomous weapon systems are designed and employed in compliance 
with international humanitarian law, states will also have pockets deep 
enough to adequately compensate victims of their actions.233 Also, given that 
states are responsible for developing, purchasing, and integrating increasingly 
autonomous weapon systems in their military forces, state responsibility may 
operate as a more effective deterrent to overuse than individual liability.234 
 
230 See, e.g., Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (granting federal jurisdiction over torts 
committed by individuals and entities in violation of international law). 
231 Indeed, international criminal law was revolutionary in large part because it held 
individuals accountable on a stage where once only states were recognized legal actors. Now, 
“transnational norm entrepreneurs” are increasingly involved in treaty negotiations, see Harold 
Hongju Koh, Address, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 
623, 656-63 (1998) (discussing the role of nonstate actors with regard to the Mine Ban Treaty), and 
“both intra-state and non-state actors are playing an increasingly influential role in the creation of 
customary international law,” Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law 
Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 12), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657693 [https://perma.cc/N5SW-K7FK]. Similarly, international 
human rights law and international investment law now accord rights to individuals, and allow 
individuals to enforce these rights directly against states. See, e.g., North American Free Trade 
Agreement ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. No. E., 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 172. 
232 Given the accountability gap, scholars are increasingly looking to the law of state 
responsibility for guidance. See, e.g., ANDERSON & WAXMAN, supra note 138, at 17 (arguing that 
upholding the abstract principles of individual accountability is not worth forgoing the potential 
concrete benefits of increasingly autonomous weapon systems); Daniel N. Hammond, Comment, 
Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 652, 668-71 (2015) 
(emphasizing state responsibility for the actions of autonomous weapon systems); Heyns Report, 
supra note 186, ¶ 81 (“In general, a stronger emphasis on State as opposed to individual responsibility 
may be called for . . . .”). 
233 See Hammond, supra note 232, at 669 (explaining that under a system of state liability, 
states would internalize the costs of crimes committed by their weapons). 
234 Cf. Nollkaemper, supra note 89, at 4 (“If the goal is termination of the crimes and 
prevention of their recurrence, individual responsibility is unlikely to do the job.”); see also Calabresi, 
supra note 197, at 718 (“[O]ne of the functions of accident law is to reduce the cost of accidents, by 
reducing those activities that are accident prone.”); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1980). 
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As a matter of doctrine, holding states accountable for the actions of their 
autonomous weapon systems requires only clarifying the applicability of 
existing law (rather than creating a new liability regime out of whole cloth). 
States are already responsible for all serious violations of international 
humanitarian law “attributable to the State under international law.”235 
Regardless of whether an autonomous weapon system is analogized to more 
conventional weaponry or a soldier, its actions should simply be attributed to 
the state fielding it.236 Once the actions of an autonomous weapon system are 
attributable to a state, that state is then “under an obligation to make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”237 Such 
reparation might “take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, 
either singly or in combination.”238 If a serious violation results in injurious 
damage and it is impossible to restore the situation to its pre-violation state, 
the state should pay compensation.239 
In practice, states often refuse to take responsibility for actions akin to 
war torts. Consider the downing of Iran Air Flight 655. Not only was this 
incident notable as one of the most deadly in aviation history—290 
passengers and crew members, including 66 children, died—it also involved 
an autonomous weapon system, albeit one operated in a semiautonomous 
mode.240 In 1988, as the Iran–Iraq War was ending, the USS Vincennes was 
patrolling in the Strait of Hormuz.241 The Vincennes was outfitted with the 
then-brand-new Aegis Combat System.242 On July 3, after taking fire from 
gunboats, the Vincennes pursued them into Iranian territorial waters. While 
 
235 Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 2(a). 
236 The question of attribution becomes more complicated where a nonstate actor is deploying 
the autonomous weapon system (or if the weapon system is itself best analogized to a nonstate 
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TZENG, YALE LAW SCH. CTR. FOR GLOB. LEGAL CHALLENGES, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
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offer guarantees of non-repetition). 
239 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 1056. 
240 Singer, Robots at War, supra note 131, at 40. 
241 Id. 
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there, the Aegis system mislabeled a passenger jet as an F-14 Tomcat. Despite 
hard data that suggested the plane was not a threat, the crew nonetheless 
authorized the Aegis to fire, resulting in the deaths of all 290 individuals on 
board.243 In 1991, Iran brought suit in the International Court of Justice, 
claiming that the United States had violated numerous treaty obligations and 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.244 Iran demanded declaratory relief, an 
order that the United States cease all unlawful conduct, and reparation for 
damages.245 The United States contested the International Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction under treaty and customary law, but in 1996 it agreed to settle for 
a $61.8 million compensation payout to the victims’ families.246 The United 
States never admitted fault, and no one on board the ship or within the Navy 
was ever publicly punished.247 
It may be, however, that states’ reluctance to admit fault is linked less to 
an unwillingness to accept responsibility than to a disinclination to accept 
moral blame. The United States actually offered to compensate the families 
of the victims shortly after the tragedy,248 and it was willing to pay millions 
of dollars to settle Iran’s claim; it was not willing to publicly acknowledge 
fault for the downing of the passenger flight in response to accusations of 
having committed a “criminal act,” an “atrocity,” and a “massacre.”249 
Similarly, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles—which stated that Germany 
accepted the responsibility for the losses and damages of World War I—was 
known as the “War Guilt Clause,” and viewed by Germans as a national 
humiliation.250 Many have even suggested it was an important factor in 
Hitler’s subsequent rise to power.251 Had it been clear that the article was 
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nytimes.com/1988/08/23/opinion/blaming-the-vincennes-victims.html [https://perma.cc/32D9-P988]. 
248 See Statement by Assistant to the President for Press Relations Fitzwater on United States 
Policy Regarding the Accidental Attack on an Iranian Jetliner over the Persian Gulf, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
934-35 (July 11, 1988). 
249 Fox Butterfield, Iran Falls Short in Drive at U.N. to Condemn U.S. in Airbus Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 15, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/15/world/iran-falls-short-in-drive-at-un-to-
condemn-us-in-airbus-case.html [https://perma.cc/NS6H-45PP]. 
250 See Versailles Peace Treaty, supra note 50, art. 231; HAJO HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF 
MODERN GERMANY: 1840-1945, at 576-77 (1964). 
251 See, e.g., ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING 
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES, at xxiii (2000). 
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assigning tort-like responsibility rather than criminal-like guilt, it would 
hardly have carried the same sting.252 
States might actually welcome a clear distinction between war torts and war 
crimes and the attendant ability to accept responsibility for injurious wrongs 
without accepting blame for criminal acts. Indeed, many states—particularly 
the political and military powerhouses that are currently employing 
autonomous weapon systems—already voluntarily compensate victims of their 
actions in armed conflicts with ex gratia payments.253 The United States, for 
example, passed domestic legislation in 1918 requiring it to pay for damages 
caused by its foreign forces,254 which it expanded into the Foreign Claims Act 
in 1942.255 U.S. claims commissioners often find ways to circumvent certain 
liability exclusions, presumably because they believe that making an award is in 
the best interests of the United States.256 And many states are party to Status 
of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which often provide a means by which 
civilians may pursue tort remedies. For example, in 1953, the United States 
ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Status of Forces Agreement, 
which established a jurisdictional regime allowing injured citizens in a host 
state to pursue civil damages for tortious acts of foreign forces.257 Twenty-six 
states are party to the NATO SOFA, and an additional twenty-two non-
NATO states have signed the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, under 
which they incur the same obligations.258 The NATO SOFA thereby provides 
a means for satisfying the “general principle of law . . . that those who cause 
injury to others compensate them.”259 These practices suggest that states 
might be willing to commit to a more formal agreement codifying their 
responsibility for war torts, or at least those war torts committed by 
autonomous weapon systems. 
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65-133, 40 Stat. 532 (1918), repealed by Act of Apr. 22, 1943, ch. 67 § 5, 57 Stat. 66 (1943). 
255 Foreign Claims Act, ch. 645, 55 Stat. 880 (1942) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2012)). 
256 Witt, supra note 202, at 1479. 
257 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Regarding the 
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2. The Argument for Strict Liability 
While strict liability may not be appropriate for all war torts, states should 
be held strictly liable for the actions of the autonomous weapon systems they 
field.260  
Tort law ostensibly has two levels of liability for apportioning 
responsibility for unintended accidents: strict liability and negligence 
liability.261 Under strict liability, an actor is held responsible for any injury 
caused by her behavior; under negligence liability, an actor is held responsible 
to the extent her failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in an injury. Strict 
liability is relatively easily determined; evaluations of negligence require 
complicated evaluations of facts, duties, and harm. As a result, selecting 
between these two regimes has significant implications for who bears the 
brunt of unintended mishaps: “Under strict liability, the costs of faultless 
accidents fall on injurers; under negligence, they fall on victims.”262  
In domestic tort law, strict liability is often employed in situations where 
it is too difficult to prove that a specific defendant failed to exercise due care 
or, even if there was a failure, that the failure caused the injurious harm. As 
weapon systems have become more complex, the causal chain of 
accountability for unintended consequences of their use has become more 
attenuated.263 A person using a sword intends to harm the person he cuts; 
regardless of whether the victim is a wounded solider or civilian child, the 
wielder is acting intentionally. Similarly, when a bomber drops an arsenal 
indiscriminately in a civilian area, the bombardier is acting recklessly. As 
temporal and geographic distances between the decision to use lethal force 
and the consequences of that action increase, however, the causal chain of 
accountability is weakened. Up until now, however, it has at least been 
 
260 To the extent a victim is responsible for his or her injury, a state should be able to employ 
the contributory negligence defense, but the burden of proof should rest on the state to demonstrate 
that the victim knowingly assumed an unreasonable risk. 
261 The dividing line between strict and negligence liability is less sharp than it first appears. 
There are many forms of negligence that operate like strict liability in practice: the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur presumes negligence from the resulting injury absent evidence of how the defendant 
behaved, and negligence per se presumes negligence from a statutory violation. See Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271 (2012) (discussing three examples of 
what he terms “strict liability in negligence”: the objective standard, the perfect-compliance rule, 
and the thin-skull rule); id. at 283 n.35 (listing “res ipsa loquitur, respondeat superior, liability for 
breach of a nondelegable duty, and joint and several liability for a single, theoretically divisible but 
practically indivisible harm” as “exhibit[ing] some feature of strict liability”). 
262 Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1235 (1988) (reviewing 
WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987), 
and STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987)). 
263 Playing off of von Clausewitz, this has been described as the “fog of technology.” Duncan Hollis, 
The Fog of Technology and International Law, OPINIO JURIS (May 15, 2015, 8:59 AM), http://
opiniojuris.org/2015/05/15/the-fog-of-technology-and-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/668F-9JLU]. 
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plausible to argue that an individual’s decision to use lethal force was a 
proximate cause of that decision’s consequences. 
Because of their capacity for independent and unpredictable action,264 
autonomous weapon systems break that chain. It will be nearly impossible to 
prove that an individual failed to exercise due care (either in the 
manufacturing, programming, or use of an autonomous weapon systems) or 
that the injuries caused by an autonomous weapon system were due to such a 
failure. In accordance with the reasoning in many products liability cases,265 
a strict liability regime is most appropriate to address the difficulty with 
tracing the causal chain of injuries caused by autonomous weapon systems. 
Additionally, strict liability is usually applied to lawful but inherently 
dangerous activities, such as possession of an animal with dangerous 
propensities or engagement in abnormally dangerous activities.266 Strict 
liability is more appropriate in such cases; under a negligence regime, the 
responsible party could escape liability by conforming to the legal standard of 
care, even if there was no reason to engage in the activity in the first place.267 
Meanwhile, strict liability incentivizes those engaging in an inherently 
dangerous activity to consider both the level of care and the level of 
activity.268  
Not only are the independent actions of autonomous weapon systems not 
fully predictable, they are also inherently dangerous. Autonomous weapon 
systems are designed and intended to kill human beings and wreak 
destruction; their capacity for independent action means they may sometimes 
kill the wrong human beings or destroy the wrong object. The use of 
autonomous weapon systems in armed conflict is therefore “ultra-
hazardous”—it involves a risk of serious harm that cannot be eliminated, even 
if utmost care is exercised.269 Given that the risk of harm can be minimized 
 
264 See supra subsection II.A.3. 
265 Cf. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) 
(“[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the 
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the 
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public 
cannot.”); se also Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 On the Approximation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective 
Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 29 (“[L]iability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole 
means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair 
apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production . . . .”). 
266 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 509, 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
267 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178 (7th ed. 2007). 
268 Calabresi, supra note 197, at 718; Shavell, supra note 234, at 3, 7, 11-12, 18-19. 
269 Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] LRE & I. App. 3 (HL); see also Langan v. Valicopters, 567 P.2d 
218, 221 (Wash. 1977) (describing the six factors used to determine whether an activity is abnormally 
dangerous, at least five of which apply to the use of autonomous weapon systems in armed conflicts); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (same). 
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only by the entity responsible for the activity, it is appropriate for that party 
to bear the full brunt of the consequences of such use.  
In addition to the inevitability of autonomous weapon systems being 
involved in a normal accident,270 they are also at risk of hacking, spoofing, and 
other such risks.271 A strict liability regime would give added impetus to states 
to limit hacking opportunities—either through increasing security measures 
or by minimizing the deployment of such weaponry.272 
In short, there are a number of arguments for regulating the actions of 
autonomous weapon systems through strict liability. Due to their capacity for 
unpredictable action and the corresponding difficulty of establishing who did 
not exercise due care in the design, manufacture, and use of an autonomous 
weapon system, it will be nearly impossible to establish legal fault under a 
negligence standard.273 In contrast, a strict liability regime places the costs of 
employing an autonomous weapon system squarely on the state (subject to a 
contributory negligence defense) and is easier to enforce; both of these will 
result in greater payouts to victims. This will encourage states to take care both 
in how they use autonomous weapon systems (ranging from increasing security 
measures to only using them in environments where there is little risk to 
unlawful targets) and in how often they use autonomous weapon systems. 
Ideally, strict liability will ultimately deter excessive usage of autonomous 
weapon systems and thereby reduce the overall number of tragic accidents. 
3. Forms and Forums 
Given the varied sources of international legal obligations, it is difficult to 
predict how a war torts regime might evolve. Soft law may develop from states’ 
domestic laws and policies, international non-binding resolutions or 
declarations, or industry practice. New customary international law may 
materialize as state practice solidifies into opinio juris sive necessitatis.274 States 
might conclude a treaty codifying norms or creating new ones.275 Judicial 
 
270 See supra subsection II.A.3.  
271 SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 15. 
272 Cf. Shavell, supra note 234, at 3. Similarly, U.S. lawmakers are currently discussing to what 
extent an automobile’s vulnerability to cyberattacks constitutes a safety defect, which would make 
manufacturers strictly liable for accidents resulting from hacks. Mike Spector, Is a Hacked Vehicle 
Also Defective?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/is-a-hacked-
vehicle-also-defective-1440457334 [https://perma.cc/US99-RQ29]. 
273 Rather, holding a state strictly liable is akin to joint enterprise liability, insofar as the state 
can be conceived as a stand-in representing the designers, manufacturers, programmers, and 
deployers of autonomous weapon systems.  
274 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993 (including “international custom” as one of the primary sources of international law). 
275 Id. art. 38(1)(a) (including “conventions” as one of the primary sources of international law). 
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opinions and academic writings may elucidate confusing concepts.276 Nor is it 
obvious, as a normative matter, what is the best form for new regulations 
regarding new technology. Treaties are clear statements of international legal 
obligations, but they are relatively inflexible; customary international law and 
soft law are responsive to state interests and new technological developments, 
but they are relatively weak: it can be difficult to identify when a new 
customary law norm is established, and soft law sources are not legally binding. 
An ideal international legal regime for the regulation of autonomous 
weapon systems would exploit the differing strengths of the different sources 
of international law. Accordingly, I have suggested elsewhere that states 
negotiate a broad framework convention that can be augmented and expanded 
by specialized additional protocols, soft and interstitial law, and domestic 
law.277 One of these additional protocols could outline an integrated 
international and domestic liability regime for autonomous weapon systems. 
At the very least, it should reiterate and clarify the relevance of the law of 
state responsibility. It could also clarify common definitions, describe 
overarching regulatory aims, and require member states to pass legislation 
creating domestic liability for both war crimes and war torts (which may 
entail waiving sovereign immunity). 
Ambitiously, a treaty might establish an independent tribunal for 
autonomous weapon systems’ war torts, much like the ICC or other 
specialized criminal tribunals.278 Theoretically, the International Court of 
Justice could also serve as a forum for such suits, but its jurisdiction 
limitations will reduce its usefulness. The Court has jurisdiction only in 
contentious cases on the basis of state consent: states may agree to bring a 
specific issue before the Court by submitting a compromis,279 or states may 
accept the Court’s jurisdiction as generally compulsory.280 Many powerful 
states have refused to accept or have withdrawn from the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction,281 and a state allegedly responsible for an autonomous weapon 
system’s internationally wrongful act would have little incentive to submit a 
compromis. States employing autonomous weapon systems might be more 
 
276 Id. art. 38(1)(d) (noting that judicial decisions and academic commentary provide a 
“subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law”). 
277 Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1897-99. 
278 Cf. Steintz, supra note 18 (proposing an “International Court of Civil Justice”). 
279 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
280 Id. art. 36(2). 
281 Only 72 of the 193 U.N. member states are subject to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. 
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 [https://perma.cc/Y3YF-9TZ5] (last updated Apr. 15, 2016). 
Notably, four members of the Security Council—China, France, Russia, and the United States—do 
not currently accept compulsory jurisdiction. 
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willing to submit to the limited jurisdiction of a specialized tribunal, however, 
as it will not open the possibility of other kinds of suits. 
A carefully tailored independent tribunal would also help alleviate the 
plaintiff problem. Tort suits are usually initiated by the injured party, which 
seemingly ensures that only important wrongs are litigated. However, there 
are significant drawbacks to limiting war torts plaintiffs to either states or 
individuals. There are myriad political reasons a state might decide against 
bringing an otherwise strong war tort suit against another state, and 
individuals often do not have the resources or wherewithal to bring suits 
against states themselves. But tort law is not the only legal regime where 
accountability for wrongs is sometimes foregone; prosecutorial discretion 
serves a similar aim in criminal law. To the extent war torts are wrongful acts 
that affect the international legal order, it would be appropriate to charge 
independent prosecutorial-like actors—call them “International 
Representative Plaintiffs”—with bringing war tort suits against states on 
behalf of harmed individuals. These International Representative Plaintiffs 
could have the independent power to determine when a suit should be 
brought, and states and individuals could also petition them to consider 
specific cases. 
An integrated international and domestic liability regime would be a 
familiar extension of the way international and domestic liability regimes 
currently interact to create more effective enforcement mechanisms. Treaties 
often require states to pass national legislation implementing the treaty’s 
provisions without mandating the specifics of how that is to be done. For 
example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions oblige state parties to search for and 
try or extradite persons alleged to have committed or alleged to have ordered 
the commission of war crimes,282 and the Chemical Weapons Convention 
requires state parties to, “in accordance with [their] constitutional process, 
adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this 
Convention” and proceeds to detail certain crucial requirements.283 
However, the international community need not collectively organize to 
create tort liability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems. One nation-
state could do so singlehandedly, simply by passing domestic legislation with 
universal jurisdiction. In fact, depending on the alleged tort violation, it is 
possible that the Alien Tort Statute could already be used to prosecute 
individuals for war torts caused by autonomous weapon systems.284 However, 
 
282 First Geneva Convention, supra note 36, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 
36, art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 36, art. 129; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 
36, art. 146. 
283 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 38, art. VII. 
284 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ATS provides jurisdiction only for violations of 
customary international law that either were recognized as such at the time the statute was adopted in 
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because of the political problems associated with attempting to hold foreign 
states accountable for international law violations in domestic courts285 and the 
foreign policy conflicts legislation like the ATS engenders,286 it would be far 
preferable to have an overarching international war torts regime than a 
domestic one. 
4. The Time Is Now 
When liability for war torts is created is less important than whether it is 
created—but timing may affect what is possible. States can await the 
inevitable tragic accident before constructing a responsive tort liability 
regime, but it would be far preferable if they took proactive action. 
Timing is always an issue in attempting to regulate new technology.287 It 
is of particular importance in the international legal order, however, as the 
lack of a single authoritative lawmaker renders international law prone to 
reactive lawmaking. 
There is much to be said for reactive lawmaking when attempting to 
regulate a poorly understood new technology. First, it allows for a great deal 
of flexibility; instead of preemptively making rules or regulatory standards 
that will quickly become outdated, legal developments will track 
technological ones. Second, it avoids inadvertently constraining beneficial 
innovation through overbroad rules. If autonomous weapon systems are 
eventually better able to comply with the law of armed conflict than human 
soldiers, for example, it would be unfortunate to ban them at this early stage 
of development. Finally, and perhaps most influentially, reactive lawmaking 
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Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 5 (2007). If the actions of autonomous weapon systems result in such 
violations, the ATS may allow for prosecutions in U.S. courts if the statute’s other jurisdictional 
requirements are satisfied. See supra note 16 (detailing other jurisdictional limitations). 
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287 See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law, in 
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Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239. 
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has the benefit of inertia. It appears costless, as states need not invest time in 
treaty negotiations or norm-building conversations. Indeed, some suggested 
proactive regulations of new technology have proven to be utterly 
superfluous.288 When an autonomous weapon system inevitably takes action 
that results in a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the 
responsible state will advocate for the most politically advantageous solution, 
the international community will respond, and international law will evolve. 
But the evolutionary approach to lawmaking has a major drawback: it 
foregoes a precious opportunity to use law responsibly to channel the 
development of this new kind of weaponry.289 Technology and law have long 
been dancing, and they regularly trade the lead—this is a situation where law 
should seize it.290 International law—even treaty law—is not set in stone; 
instead, it is constantly evolving in response to state action and interests.291 
Left unregulated, states might employ increasingly autonomous weapon 
systems in ways that undermine hard-won humanitarian protections.292 The 
stakes here are too high to leave to the vagaries of responsive state practice. 
Not only may acting now make it possible to create tort liability for the 
actions of autonomous weapon systems, it is a precipitous time for legal 
intervention. States—particularly those states fielding increasingly autonomous 
weapon systems—are participating in international conversations on the subject 
and expressing an interest in developing regulations.293 
5. A Useful Test Case 
Why would states create a liability regime for an autonomous weapon 
system’s war torts? Consider the failure to create tort remedies for 
 
288 See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of 
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environmental damage, notwithstanding decades of effort from activists and 
civil society294: While the issues with transboundary pollution are clear and 
obvious, states remain reluctant to accept direct liability or to create tort 
liability for private actors.295 Given the likelihood of accidents in armed 
conflicts and the high stakes associated with the use of lethal force, why would 
states have any interest in creating a new liability regime? 
In environmental law, the alternative to tort liability is no liability.296 At 
first glance, it appears that is the case here: if no one can be held directly or 
indirectly liable under existing law, there appears to be little incentive for 
states to create a new liability regime. However, an autonomous weapon 
system will eventually and inevitably act in a way that results in significant 
death or destruction with no one acting willfully. When that occurs, there will 
be widespread outcry to hold some person or entity accountable. Absent a 
regime or theory of tort liability for such actions, it is likely that criminal law 
will be read to create ex post liability for a “crime” that calls out for 
punishment, much as occurred at Nuremberg. The alternative to tort liability 
will not be no liability—instead, it will likely be expanded criminal liability. 
And not only is this morally questionable, it threatens to undermine the 
legitimacy of all of international criminal law.297 
Not only do states have a vested interest in creating a tort liability regime, 
the unpredictability and inherently dangerous nature of autonomous weapon 
systems justify treating responsibility for this weapons technology 
differently. Unlike other weapons, autonomous weapon systems are capable 
of acting independently, breaking the causal chain between an individual’s 
decision to deploy them and the target of these weapons’ ultimate use of lethal 
force. And, unlike other robots, autonomous weapon systems are intended to 
kill people—they just are not supposed to kill the wrong people. The 
combination of these two factors strongly favor imposing strict liability. In 
contrast, when a non-autonomous or nonlethal weapon system malfunctions 
and causes a serious violation of international humanitarian law, a negligence 
standard may be more appropriate. It is therefore possible to draw a line in 
the sand and create a limited strict liability tort regime governing the actions 
of autonomous weapon systems. Indeed, it may prove a useful test case: if it 
is a successful counterpart to international criminal law, states may consider 
the utility of further expanding state liability for war torts. 
 
294 Sachs, supra note 12, at 838. 
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297 See supra subsection II.B.4. 
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This Article’s proposal naturally raises the question of whether states 
should be responsible and provide compensation for all war torts—not just 
those committed by autonomous weapon systems. Furthermore, why 
shouldn’t state responsibility extend to encompass all unanticipated harm to 
civilians resulting from actions attributable to a state?298 Addressing these 
questions and outlining a comprehensive international war torts regime akin to 
what has developed in international criminal law is beyond the scope of this 
Article. I look forward to exploring these and related issues in future work. 
CONCLUSION 
The conversation on accountability for the actions of autonomous weapon 
systems has been trapped in the language of “war crimes.” International 
criminal law is useful in assigning individual liability in situations where a 
human being employs autonomous weapon systems recklessly or with the 
intention of committing a war crime. However, it is toothless in situations 
where no individual acts willfully. 
This is not a failure of international criminal law; this is a feature, not a 
bug. Criminal law aims to prohibit certain actions altogether, through 
stigmatization and punishment, and individual criminal liability allows for 
the evaluation of whether someone is guilty of a moral wrong. This 
framework is not appropriate when attempting to regulate the use of a 
valuable but sometimes unpredictable and dangerous weapon. Instead, an 
international tort liability regime is the best solution to the autonomous 
weapon system accountability gap.299 
At present, “[w]hether civilian casualties [in armed conflicts] are merely 
tragic accidents or war crimes depends on mens rea, and the intentions of 
those who order attacks and carry them out.”300 International criminal law 
exists to hold individuals accountable for war crimes; a complementary legal 
regime is necessary to hold states accountable for their war torts. 
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